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Economic efficiency and societal equity are two important goals of public policy. 
Energy and climate policies have the potential to affect both. Efficiency is increased by 
substituting low-carbon energy for fossil energy (mitigating an externality) while equity 
is served if such substitution enhances consumption opportunities of unfavored groups 
(low income households or future generations). However policies that are effective in 
reducing pollution may not be so effective in redistributing consumption and vice-versa. 
This dissertation explores potential trade-offs between equity and efficiency arising in 
energy and climate policies.  
Chapter 1 yields two important results. First, while effective in reducing pollution, 
energy efficiency policies may fall short in protecting future generations from resource 
depletion. Second, deployment of technologies that increase the ease with which capital 
can substitute for energy may enhance the ability of societies to sustain consumption and 
achieve intertemporal equity.  
Results in Chapter 1 imply that technologies more intensive in capital and materials 
and less intensive in carbon such as corn ethanol may be effective in enhancing 
intertemporal equity. However the effectiveness of corn ethanol (relative to other 
  
 
 
technologies) in reducing emissions will depend upon the environmental performance of 
the industry. Chapter 2 measures environmental efficiency of ethanol plants, identifies 
ways to enhance performance, and calculates the cost of such improvements based on a 
survey of ethanol plants in the US. Results show that plants may be able to increase 
profits and reduce emissions simultaneously rendering the ethanol industry more effective 
in tackling efficiency. 
Finally while cap and trade proposals are designed to correcting a market failure by 
reducing pollution, allocation of emission allowances may affect income distribution and, 
hence, intra-temporal equity. Chapter 3 proves that under plausible conditions on 
preferences and technology increasing efficiency requires greater transfers to low income 
households the higher the effect of these transfers on the price of permits and the lower 
their effect on the price of consumption goods. This denotes market conditions under 
which efficiency and equity are complementary goals.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
EERGY POLICY AD SUSTAIABLE COSUMPTIO 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Whenever a natural resource is both essential in production1 and exhaustible, a faster 
rate of extraction by current generations may imply lower consumption possibilities for 
future generations. This intergenerational externality is at the heart of the notion of 
sustainability. If current consumption and the resulting resource extraction pattern do in 
fact reduce the consumption possibilities of future generations the economy is on a path 
considered unsustainable. Sustaining consumption across generations requires reduction, 
through time, of the quantity of resource used per unit of output (resource intensity). 
Success in achieving that goal will critically depend upon productivity growth and 
technological possibilities for substituting away from the exhaustible resource in 
production.  
Exhaustible energy (fossil energy plus nuclear energy) is perhaps the most relevant 
essential exhaustible resource in modern economies. An impressive 92%2 of total energy 
consumption in the world comes from exhaustible sources. This percentage rises to 
93.3%3 of total energy consumption in the US (85% from fossil fuels and 8.3% from 
nuclear). Although renewable sources of energy have gained terrain in the last ten years, 
with current technologies and despite public efforts, no alternative energy source has 
shown the potential to replace non-renewable sources at an even moderate scale in the 
near future. 
                                                 
1 An input is essential if production collapses to zero whenever the quantity of the input is zero. 
2 EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2009. 
3 EIA, Annual Energy Outlook, 2009. 
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The American Clean Energy and Security bill of 2009 (ACESA) includes provisions 
in Titles I and II for the development and adoption of technologies that would reduce 
(exhaustible) energy intensity. In the electricity sector some of these are biomass-coal co-
firing (technologies that produce energy from burning biomass and coal), efficiency gains 
(technologies that obtain more electricity per unit of exhaustible energy burned), smart 
grid,4 power transmission system upgrades, and combined heat and power systems 
(systems that both produce efficiency gains and could be fired by biomass). In 
transportation new technologies include E85, flexible fuel vehicles, and electric vehicles. 
While all these technologies are supported due to their “energy saving” nature they are 
bound to affect substitutability of capital and other inputs for exhaustible energy 
asymmetrically and hence they may have different effects on sustainable consumption. 
Whenever an input is both essential in production and exhaustible, the quantity used 
of that input has to converge asymptotically to zero if a given level of production is to be 
sustained indefinitely.5 We depict technology in Figure 1 by an isoquant describing 
substitution possibilities between man-made capital and exhaustible energy (i.e. a 
composite index of exhaustible energy sources) that attain a given level of production. 
Asymptotic convergence to zero of the quantity of the natural resource used in production 
is represented by a movement along the isoquant down and to the right.  
The ability of society to substitute capital for exhaustible energy in the long run is 
represented by the asymptotic behavior of the isoquant. The flatter the isoquant in the 
                                                 
4 This “modern” version of the grid regulates provision of electricity to buildings, manages provision at 
peak hours, sets different prices at peak hours, and uses superconductivity to reduce energy loss. It is also 
thought to incorporate wind and geothermal energy to the distribution system. 
5 If the quantity does not converge asymptotically to zero then the resource stock will be exhausted in finite 
time. If it is equal to zero (rather than converging asymptotically) then production will be zero due to 
essentiality. 
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lower portion the easier it is the substitution. The slope of the isoquant in that portion can 
be affected by technological progress. The way in which technological progress affects 
the isoquant depends upon the rate and bias of technical change. In turn these will depend 
upon the type of technologies whose development and diffusion is being incentivized by 
energy policies.  
Consider, on one hand, deployment of technologies that increase the productivity of 
energy relative to capital. This type of technical change is captured by a rotation of the 
isoquant to the left. This in turn would change the isoquant from I1 to I2. Asymptotically 
is now more difficult to substitute capital for energy making it harder to sustain 
production in time. On the other hand if technologies that increase the productivity of 
capital relative to energy are deployed a rotation of the isoquant to the right will occur. 
This in turn would change the isoquant from I1 to I3. Asymptotically is now easier to 
substitute capital for energy enhancing the ability of society to sustain production in time. 
Additionally suppose a technology that increases the flexibility with which capital 
and energy can substitute for each other is deployed. This is captured by a flattening of 
the isoquant (I4). This change also increases the ability of society to substitute capital for 
energy asymptotically. Finally consider a technology that increases efficiency of both 
capital and energy equally without affecting relative productivities. This would be 
captured by a change from I1 to I5 which also increases ease of substitution 
asymptotically. 
It is inferred from Figure 1 that the nature of the technology being incentivized is of 
importance to determine their effect in asymptotic substitutability between capital and 
energy and hence in the capacity of society to sustain production in time. Yet no 
  
 
4 
assessment of the role of different technologies incentivized in ACESA has been 
conducted so far. The main reason for this is that economic evaluations of ACESA focus 
on the effectiveness of technologies in reducing emissions from energy rather than their 
effectiveness in reducing use of energy obtained from exhaustible resources. Therefore an 
appropriate assessment of the impact of energy policies in sustainability should account 
for the different effects that incentivized technologies have on substitution possibilities 
and, hence, sustainable consumption.  
 
Figure 1. Technical Progress and Changes in Relative Factor Productivities 
 
2. Previous Literature 
Previous studies (Dasgupta and Heal 1974; Solow 1974; Stiglitz 1974; Martinet and 
Doyen 2007) have identified conditions under which an economy could sustain 
consumption (and ideally per capita consumption) indefinitely. Important insights and a 
rather optimistic view came out of that literature. Three main economic forces capable of 
offsetting natural resource scarcity were identified: substitution of capital for resource 
Energy 
K 
I1 
  I3 
 I2 
  I4   I
5 
  
 
5 
(through capital accumulation or savings), technological progress, and increasing returns 
to scale.  
These studies based their analysis on specific functional forms representing feasible 
input-output combinations. More specifically they approximate technological possibilities 
with a production function displaying constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between 
capital and natural resource and Hicks neutral technical change. The main results 
regarding the role of capital accumulation and technological progress can be summarized 
as follows. Capital accumulation can by itself sustain consumption whenever the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and energy is greater than one. Neither capital 
accumulation nor technological progress can sustain consumption if the elasticity of 
substitution is lower than one. Under unitary elasticity of substitution (Cobb Douglas) 
capital accumulation can sustain consumption if the elasticity of production with respect 
to capital is greater than that with respect to natural resource. In addition, if the latter 
condition holds, technological progress increases the level of sustainable consumption. 
There is, however, an important drawback to the assumption of constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES). Under CES whenever the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and resource is greater than unity, essentiality of inputs is lost.6 As a consequence 
sustainability is guaranteed.  
Therefore the constant substitution assumption may actually be generating a spurious 
link between substitution and sustainability. One may be induced to believe that 
whenever the elasticity of substitution is greater than one capital accumulation may be 
                                                 
6 The general (1 output – n inputs) CES approximation to technology with elasticity of substitution 
different from one is 
1/
1
n
i i
i
y x
ρ
ρα
=
 
=  
 
∑  where ρ  represents the elasticity of substitution. It is easily seen 
from this expression that when an individual input is zero production does not collapses to zero. 
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enough to sustain consumption and thus that sustainability may be achieved through high 
savings rates. But in this case sustainability is actually driven by the fact that the resource 
is not essential in production rather than by a high rate of capital accumulation. Moreover 
whenever the elasticity of substitution is below unity the economy is doomed and no 
economic force can offset that. This result seems rather extreme and the natural question 
one may ask is whether it is robust to the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
The literature assuming constant and unitary elasticity of substitution (Solow, Stiglitz, 
and Martinet et al.), i.e. Cobb Douglas approximation, preserves essentiality and finds 
both capital accumulation and technological progress to be important in sustaining 
consumption but faces two problems. A unitary elasticity of substitution is inconsistent 
with empirical evidence (Koetse 2008) and it rules out (by fixing the elasticity of 
substitution to a specific value) any interaction between technological progress and 
substitution. This implies that when using a Cobb Douglas approximation to the 
technology, policies that induce deployment of technologies such as flexible fuel vehicles 
and co-fueled power plants that may affect capital-resource substitutability would be 
ruled out by assumption.  
Finally technological progress has been assumed Hicks-neutral7 in previous studies, 
which is problematic for two reasons. First Hicks neutral technical change is inconsistent 
with available empirical evidence (Sue Wing and Eckaus 2004; Klump 2007). Second if 
technological progress changes the productivity of capital relative to that of the resource 
(through technologies such as those discussed in Figure 1) it would affect substitution 
                                                 
7 Technological progress is of the Hicks neutral type when it affects total factor productivity without 
changing relative factor productivities. 
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rates between energy and other inputs and hence sustainable consumption. This effect 
would not be captured when technological progress is assumed to be Hicks-neutral.  
To sum up the investigation into the role of economic forces in sustainability has been 
conducted under restrictive technological assumptions. Especially concerning, given the 
nature of energy policies, is the fact that no insights have come out of these studies 
regarding the role of biased technical change on sustainability through its effects on both 
relative productivities and the elasticity of substitution. The present study incorporates a 
link between technological progress and substitutability by allowing for biased technical 
change and variable elasticity of substitution. This allows testing of the robustness of 
previous results in the literature and discussion of potential effects of energy policy (i.e. 
ACESA) on sustainable consumption under a more flexible framework.  
 
 
3. The Model 
We consider an economy with an essential exhaustible resource. Every period a given 
quantity of the resource is extracted and used in production. The economy is endowed 
with a technology that uses capital, a flow of services from the exhaustible natural 
resource, and other variable inputs to produce an aggregate consumption good. The 
economy is described by the Solow-Heal-Dasgupta dynamics: 
( ) ( )
.
S t r t= −           (1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
.
, , ,r K xK t f A A r t A K t A x t c t K tλ= − −     (2) 
Where ( )tK  is the stock of human-made capital at time t, ( )S t  is the level of non-
renewable resource stock, ( )tr  is the flow of the natural resource used in production, ( )tx  
  
 
8 
is a vector of other flow inputs used in production in period t (e.g. labor), A  is an 
efficiency factor capturing Hicks-neutral technological progress, iA  is an efficiency 
factor corresponding to the ith input ( xKri ,,= ) which may increase in time due to 
technical progress, ( ).f  is the production function, ( )tc  is consumption at t and λ  is the 
depreciation rate. Dots above variables denote time derivatives. 
The evolution of the exhaustible natural resource is a negative one to one function of 
the rate of extraction. Zero extraction costs are assumed. 
This economy evolves subject to the following constraints: 
( )0 r t≤   (3) ( )0 bS t=      (4) 
( )bS S t<    (5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ,r K xc t f A A r t A K t A x t<  (6) 
( )0 K t≤   (7) ( )0 bc c t< ≤      (8) 
Where bS  and bc  are arbitrarily chosen values (subscript b denotes “boundary” levels). 
The combination of equations (4) and (5) establishes that existing stocks of the resource 
have to be positive at all times which is a natural condition to impose under essentiality. 
From now on the index t will be dropped from the variables for notational simplicity. 
The evolution of the stock of human made capital is the difference between output, 
consumption, and depreciation. The combination of (6) and (8) yields the inequality 
( ), ,b r K xc f A r A K A x< . Plugging this into equation (2) leaves: 
( )
.
, , ,r K x bK f A A r A K A x c Kλ≤ − −         (9) 
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Equation (9) is a differential inclusion denoting the set of all feasible paths for capital 
evolution.8 By solving (9) we find trajectories of resource and capital that are consistent 
with constraints (3)–(8) at every period t and forever. 
A solution to (9) can be obtained exploiting viability theory which was developed by 
Aubin (1991) and extended to models of growth with exhaustible resources by Martinet 
and Doyen (2007). Viability theory9 does not attempt to choose any "optimal solution" 
according to given criteria, but selects "viable evolutions" defined as such by ecological, 
economic, and/or social constraints that state variables are supposed to fulfill. These 
constraints can be derived from objectives, conservation principles, scientific results of 
modeling, or precautionary principles. In this economy the main constraint is imposed by 
technology. The other important constraint is the level of consumption to keep constant. 
Consumption is fixed at the maximum level that can be sustained through time.  
The levels of natural resource 0S  and capital 0K  for which there exists at least one 
resource extraction profile that sustains consumption at bc  while preventing natural 
resource exhaustion, form a set called viability kernel. A more technical definition of the 
viability kernel is (Martinet and Doyen, 2007):  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
0 0
,  there exist decisions . , .  and states . , .
, , , ,
starting from ,  satisying conditons 3 8  for any time t
b b
S K c r S K
Viab K x r c S
S K +
  
=  
− ∈ℜ  
 
Emptiness of the viability kernel means that there is no extraction profile that can 
maintain consumption at bc  without exhausting the natural resource in finite time. 
                                                 
8  If the expression maps to a point instead of a set the differential inclusion becomes a differential 
equation. 
9 There is by now an established theoretical and empirical literature applying viability theory to economic 
analysis. Its theoretical foundations can be found in Aubin (1991). Applications of viability can be found in 
Bene, Doyen, and Gabay (2001), and Doyen and Bene (2003).  
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Therefore sustainability of bc  is equivalent to non-emptiness of the viability kernel given 
the technology, and the initial stocks of resources, 0S  and capital 0K . We discuss now 
the process by which the viability kernel is derived.  The discussion follows Martinet and 
Doyen closely. 
 
Viability Kernel 
Suppose we have a general approximation to the economy’s technology denoted by the 
function ( )xArAKAAf xrK ,,, . Provided all inputs are essential in production, the 
resource extraction rate is always positive and, hence, the stock of the exhaustible 
resource is always decreasing. Moreover, the extraction profile not only reduces the 
natural resource stock but also affects the capital stock through the equation of motion for 
capital. Therefore we can express the minimum stock required to sustain a given level of 
consumption bc  as ( ), , , bV K x S c  and its evolution by: 
( ), , , b
V V V
V V K x S c K x S
K x S
∂ ∂ ∂
+∇ = + +
∂ ∂ ∂
ɺɺ ɺ ɺ  
We will apply this analysis to a data set where the variable input (x) is labor. We will 
assume in this analysis no population growth and, therefore, we set here xɺ =0. This 
assumption does not affect the “sustainable” rate of extraction (see first order condition 
(10’’) below) and it will only affect the expression for sustainable consumption (equation 
(11)) quantitatively. This is not such a harmful assumption in this context as our main 
purpose is to explore the qualitative link between technical change and sustainable 
consumption rather than accurate computation of sustainable consumption. 
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Assuming that the minimum stock is an autonomous expression (not a direct function 
of time and, hence, 0V =ɺ ) and using the system of equations of motion (1)-(2) and the 
approximation to the technology we can re-express  ( ), , , bV V K x S c+∇ɺ  as: 
( ) ( )( ), , , , , ,b r K x b
V
V K x r c f A A r A K A x K c r
K
λ
∂
∇ = − − −
∂
    (10) 
The boundary of the viability kernel, is characterized by an extraction profile that 
makes Kɺ , and Sɺ , tangent or inward to the viability kernel; i.e. an extraction profile such 
that V(.) is the solution to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:10  
( )
( ){ }, , , , , , 0b br C K S x cMin V K x r cε ∇ =        (10’) 
Where ( ) ( ){ }, , ,    :  , , ,    and   0  b b K r xC K S x c r c f A A K A r A x   S= < <  
Expression (10’) establishes two conditions simultaneously. First ( ), , , 0bV K x r c∇ =  
at the optimum and, second, the extraction rate has to minimize ( ), , , bV K x r c∇ . The first 
order condition (FOC) for the minimization of  ( ).V∇  with respect to r  yields: 
( )xAKArAAfK
V
xKbrr ,,,
1
−=
∂
∂
       (10’’) 
Where ( ).rf  is the marginal product of the natural resource and the subscript b  in r  
denotes “boundary” level of r . 
                                                 
10 The general expression for the HJB is a function V that solves:  
( )
( )
.
, , ,
, , , 0
b
b
r C K S x c
V Min V K x r c
ε
+ ∇ = . Since we 
have assumed V to be autonomous function of time, 0V =ɺ  and equation (10’) is obtained. We refer to 
Aubin (1991, Clark (1995), or Martinet and Doyen (2007) for details.  
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The expression in (10’) is a HJB equation under autonomous function V(.) and it 
implies that the optimal resource extraction path has to follow FOC (10’’) and make 
( ), , , bV K x r c∇  equal to zero: 
 ( ) 





∂
∂
−−=
K
V
rKfc bb /. λ         (11) 
Where subscripts b denote “boundary” levels.  
Combining this expression with equation (10’’) yields ( ) ( ) bbr crfKf =+−  .. λ , which 
implicitly defines br , the minimum boundary level of resource extraction consistent with 
a minimum boundary level of consumption. If an explicit expression can be obtained for 
br  this could be represented by  
( )Θ= ,;,,,, λbKxrb cKAxAAAGr        (11’)  
Where Θ  is a vector of technological parameters. 
The lower bound of the viability kernel of this economy can be expressed as:11 
( )
( )( )
1
, , , ,
, , , , ; , , , , ;
b
b b b
r r x K b r K xc
V K x r c S dK S
f A G A A x A K c A A K A xλ
∞
= +
Θ Θ∫  (12) 
This expression depicts the minimum level of the resource stock for which there is a 
trajectory of extraction rates that can keep consumption constant at bc  without 
exhausting the stock of the resource in finite time. 
The viability kernel can now be re-defined as the epigraph12 of the: 
( ), , , ,b bV K x r c S : ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , , , , ,  such that , , , ,b b b bViab K x r c S S K x S V K x r c S= ≥ .  
                                                 
11 The derivation of the lower bound of the viability kernel involves combining (10’) and (11’), integrating 
both sides, taking limits as k approaches ∞  and rearranging. As a result the minimum stock of the 
resource, bS , appears in the equation. This will later be illustrated in proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. 
12 The epigraph of a function is the set of points lying on or above its graph. 
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From this definition we can see that if ( ) 0>∀∞= bb ccV then the viability kernel is 
empty. Of course it is expected that the higher the level of consumption we want to 
maintain, the higher the minimum stock of natural resource needed (i.e.
( )
0>
∂
∂
b
b
c
cV
) and 
hence the three statements below are equivalent: 
o There is no positive bc that can be sustained forever 
o  ( ), , , , 0b b bV K x r c S c= ∞ ∀ >  
o ( ), , , ,b bViab K x r c S =∅  0bc∀ >  
Deriving conditions such that ( ), , , ,b bV K x r c S  is finite is equivalent to deriving 
conditions for non-emptiness of the viability kernel and existence of a set of indefinitely 
sustainable consumption levels bcc ≤ . The necessary and sufficient conditions for non 
emptiness of the viability kernel are those guaranteeing that the integral in the first term 
of equation (12) converges (i.e. it does not equal∞ ) which will depend upon the 
asymptotic behavior of the integrand. Finally we calculate maximum sustainable 
consumption by solving the integral in (12) and finding bc .  
To explore the role of technological progress on sustainability the technology is 
approximated with forms that allow more flexibility, compared to the previous literature, 
in capturing technical change and substitution possibilities. Then using (12) we find 
conditions for the existence and level of maximum sustainable consumption and study the 
impact of biased technical progress and broader substitution possibilities. 
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4. Technology and Sustainability Analysis with Exhaustible Energy 
The rest of the paper uses the theory above with the technological modifications 
introduced in the analysis of a non-renewable energy resource.  The conditions under 
which a positive sustainable consumption exists are derived, then the maximum 
sustainable consumption given depletion of stocks of non-renewable energy is obtained. 
Although we address the case of exhaustible energy we would like to stress the fact that 
the extensions and conclusions derived in this paper are not confined to the case of 
energy but are rather applicable to a wider range of exhaustible resources such as the 
ones mentioned in the introduction.   
Previous studies looking at the effect of technological progress and capital 
accumulation on sustainability approximated technological possibilities with a Cobb 
Douglas specification ( ), , , X K Ef A x K E A x K Eα α α=  where output y  is a function of 
capital K, a vector of “other inputs” x which will be made explicit soon, non-renewable 
energy E,13 and an efficiency factor A (usually modeled as exogenous technical change, 
teφ ) which determines total factor productivity without affecting relative factor 
productivities (Hicks-neutral technical change). Important parameters describing the 
properties of this production function are the production elasticity with respect to inputs, 
the elasticity of scale, and the elasticity of substitution: 
o Input production elasticity is defined as the percentage change in output after a one 
percent change in the level of the input. Capital elasticity of production is ( )ln .
ln
K
d f
d k
α=  
and energy elasticity of production is ( )ln .
ln
E
d f
d E
α= .  
                                                 
13 This is equivalent to the rate of extraction r from our previous generic analysis. 
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o The elasticity of scale is the percentage change in output after a proportional change 
in the level of all inputs, 
( )( )
1
ln , ,
ln
d f K E x
d
λ
λ λ λ
λ
=
= K E Xα α α+ +   
o The (Morishima)14 elasticity of substitution (MES) between capital and energy is a 
measure of the ease with which energy can be substituted for capital in production and is 
expressed as: 
F
F
E
f
F
F
K
f KEKKEEM
kE −=σ  where F  is the determinant of the bordered 
Hessian of the production function, Ef  is the marginal productivity of energy flow, Kf  is 
the marginal productivity of capital, E is the energy flow used in production, K is capital 
used in production and KEF  is the cofactor associated with KEf  which is the derivative of 
the marginal productivity of capital with respect to energy. MkEσ >0 means the inputs are 
substitutes and MkEσ <0 means they are complements. In this particular case the elasticity 
of substitution is constant and equal to 1. 
o Rate of Hicks-neutral technological change: 
lnd y
dA
. 
As can be seen from the parameters above the technological factor A does not enter into 
the expressions for the capital or energy production elasticities. Therefore technological 
progress does not affect inputs’ relative productivity. Likewise A does not affect the 
elasticity of substitution. Therefore there is no role for technological progress in 
substitutability in this context. Under this approximation to technology previous literature 
has found that without technological progress (φ  = 0) a positive sustainable consumption 
exists whenever the capital elasticity of production is greater than that of energy 
                                                 
14 We use Morishima elasticities instead of Allen elasticities. It is argued in the literature (Blackorby and 
Rusell (1989)) that the Morishima elasticity is “superior” because: it is asymmetric, it is an exact measure 
of ease of substitution, and it provides complete comparative static information about relative factor shares. 
  
 
16 
( K Eα α> ). Moreover sustainable consumption, if it exists, increases with positive 
technological progress (φ  > 0). While technological progress can increase sustainable 
consumption, its role in existence was not explored.  
To overcome the limitation that technological progress does not affect relative factor 
productivity and to explore its role in existence we introduce the possibility of biased 
technological progress, i.e. technological progress that affects the capital-energy relative 
factor productivity. We will consider the case where technological progress may also 
affect the elasticity of substitution afterwards.  
 
4.1. Technological Progress and Relative Productivities: Introducing Biased Technical 
Change 
We maintain in this section the assumption of constant and unitary elasticity of 
substitution but introducing the possibility of biased technological progress. An 
expression for a Cobb Douglas function with factor-augmenting technical change is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , X K Ex K Ef A x K E A A x A K A E
α α α
=      (13) 
For the purpose of this study we will assume 1=xA ,
15 KKA K
ε
α=  and EEA E
γ
α= . 
Hence the productivity of capital and energy depend upon their own accumulated levels. 
The parameters ε  and γ  capture innovations increasing the efficiency of capital and 
energy respectively while Kα  and Eα  are assumed constant. Therefore a higher diffusion 
of technologies such as first and second generation biofuels, biomass and fossil co-fueled 
gasification, biomass-fired combined heat and power, wind, and solar would increase ε . 
                                                 
15 Therefore there is no technological progress increasing the efficiency of inputs other than capital and 
energy. 
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On the other hand higher diffusion of fossil-fired combined heat and power, smart grid, 
and other technologies achieving efficiency gains in the use of exhaustible energy would 
increase γ . 
This specification is consistent with the type of technical change derived in models of 
endogenous growth by Acemoglu (2002a) and has three main advantages: it is flexible in 
the sense that it allows for non-neutral technical change, it is able to generate empirical 
regularities,16 and it is consistent with empirical evidence for the U.S. offered by Wing 
and Eckaus using an extended version of Jorgenson’s KLEM data.17  
Parameters describing the properties of this production function are as follows: 
o Input production elasticity is defined as the percentage change in output after a one 
percent change in the level of the input. Capital elasticity of production is 
( )ln .
ln
K
d f
d k
α ε= +  and energy elasticity of production is 
( )ln .
ln
E
d f
d E
α γ= + .  
o The capital and energy relative factor productivity is depicted by the marginal rate of 
substitution between both inputs, KKE
E
f
MRS
f
= =
( )
( )
K
E
E
K
α ε
α γ
+
+
 
o Elasticity of Scale: XEK αγαεα ++++   
o Elasticity of substitution: constant and equal to 1 
                                                 
16 Acemoglu (2002b) stresses 4 important empirical regularities: 1) the past sixty years have seen a large 
increase in the supply of more educated workers, while returns to education have risen; 2) returns to 
education fell during the 1970s, when there was a very sharp increase in the supply of educated workers. 
Returns to education then began a steep rise during the 1980s; 3) Overall wage inequality rose sharply 
beginning in the early 1970s. Increases in within-group (residual) inequality, account for much of this rise; 
4) Average wages have stagnated and wages of low-skill workers have fallen in real terms since 1970. 
17 Estimations in that paper revealed strong evidence in favor a non neutral embodied technological 
progress. 
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o Rate of technological change: ( ) ( )ln ln ln( )RTC K d E d d Aε γ= + + . If we start at 
0== γε , then εε =d  and γγ =d  and we can re-express the rate of technical change in 
terms of  ε  and γ : ( ) ( ) )ln(lnln AdEKRTC ++= γε .   
o Input bias of technological change (IBTC). Technical change is capital (energy) 
augmenting if 
( ) ( )γα
γ
εα
ε
+
−
+
=
EK
dd
IBTC 0)(<> . Then, if we start at 0== γε , 
γ
α
α
ε
E
KIBTC )(0)( <>⇔<> . 
In contrast to the previous approximation to technology, here technological progress 
affects both the capital elasticity of production and the energy elasticity allowing for 
biased technical change. We will now derive conditions for existence of a positive 
sustainable consumption and obtain an expression for maximum sustainable 
consumption. From these we will be able to infer the role of biased technical change in 
sustainability.  
First we proceed to derive the viability kernel of this economy approximating 
technological possibilities with (13) and assuming zero capital depreciation.18 
PROPOSITION 1. Consider an economy using exhaustible energy, with no capital 
depreciation ( )0=λ  and a CD technology with endogenous factor augmenting technical 
change ( ) γαεαα ++= EKX EKxAf . where γε , ≥0. Then the viability kernel depends on 
parameters as follows: 
                                                 
18 Results for existence of a positive sustainable consumption under positive capital depreciation have been 
derived and are available from the authors. 
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( )
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )
( )
,  such that S V , ,           if 
, , , ,                                                               and 1 
                                                           other
b b K E
b b E
S K K c S
Viab K x r c S
α ε α γ
α γ
≥ + > +
= + <
∅ wise 





Where ( ), , , ,b bV K x r c S  is a function defined by: 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
, , , ,
1
EX
E KE E
Eb
b b b
K E E
CA x
V K x r c S K S
γ
α γα
α γ α εα α γ
α γ
α ε α γ α γ
+
− +
− + − ++
+
 
= + 
 + − +  − +  
 
Proof: Appendix A.1. 
A capital elasticity of production greater than that of energy, ( ) ( )K Eα ε α γ+ > + , and a 
sufficiently low energy-augmenting technical change, ( ) 1Eα γ+ < , are necessary and 
sufficient for non emptiness of the viability kernel or, equivalently, existence of a 
positive sustainable consumption. Therefore capital augmenting technical change, in 
contrast to Hicks-neutral technical change, can guarantee existence of a positive 
sustainable consumption. In particular if 1E Kα α ε γ− < − <  then existence is guaranteed. 
Finally the elasticity of scale plays no role in existence. The mechanics behind this result 
may be better understood by looking at our illustration in Figure 1. Capital augmenting 
technical change tends to rotate the isoquant to the right reducing the slope in the inferior 
portion of the isoquant (i.e. when energy tends to zero) therefore reducing the ability of 
society to substitute capital for energy asymptotically. 
Let us define the maximum level of consumption (MSC) that can be sustained in this 
economy as the maximum constant consumption for which current stocks of capital and 
resource belong to the viability kernel: 
( ) ( )( )* 0 0 0max : , , , , , ,b b bc c K S x Viab K x r c S= ∈  
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Combining this definition with the viability kernel derived in Proposition 1 yields the 
following expression for maximum sustainable consumption: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1*
1
CD 0
1
K EX E
E
E E E E
E
K E
E
E E
c A x S K
α ε α γα α γα γ
α γ α γ α γ α γα γ
α ε α γ
α γ
α γ α γ
+ − ++
+
− + − + − + +
− +
+ − +
= +
+ − +
 (14) 
From the expression above we can infer several important conclusions regarding the 
role of different economic forces in sustainability. The expression for *CDc  shows that 
maximum sustainable consumption, provided existence conditions are met, increases 
with Hicks-neutral technological progress, which is consistent with previous results by 
Stiglitz (1974). Maximum sustainable consumption also increases with capital 
augmenting technical change. These results suggest that a higher diffusion of first and 
second generation biofuels, biomass-fired energy production, wind, and solar (increases 
in ε ) would increase maximum sustainable consumption. On the other hand higher 
diffusion of technologies achieving efficiency gains in the use of exhaustible energy such 
as fossil-fired combined heat and power, and smart grid (increases in γ ) may harm 
sustainability by either increasing likelihood of inexistence of a positive sustainable 
consumption or reducing maximum sustainable consumption. This is due to the fact that 
these technologies increase the productivity of energy relative to other inputs reducing 
the ability of society to substitute capital for energy. 
Moreover maximum sustainable consumption increases with resource endowment (
0S ), 
and non energy inputs, x  and K . This implies that higher savings rate and capital 
accumulation enhance sustainability. In particular the elasticity of MSC with respect to 
capital is 
( ) ( )
( )
K E
E
α ε α γ
α γ
+ − +
+
 implying that the more productive capital is relative to 
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energy the higher the impact of savings and capital accumulation on sustainable 
consumption. Given the way in which ( )Kα ε+  and ( )Eα γ+  enter 
*
CDc  we can not state 
that a higher elasticity of scale would enhance sustainability. This is in contrast with the 
positive effect of elasticity of scale on sustainable consumption found by Stiglitz (1974). 
The analysis above has overcome one drawback of previous literature, Hicks-neutral 
technological progress. There is still however a potentially important limitation, the 
assumption of constancy of the elasticity of substitution which rules out any effect of 
technological progress on this parameter. We will now expand the analysis to overcome 
this limitation.  
 
4.2. Technological Progress and Substitution: Introducing Variable Elasticity of 
Substitution 
We are interested in approximating the technology with a production function that 
allows for variable elasticity of substitution and essentiality of inputs. The following 
transcendental specification (using the same type of technological progress as before) 
fulfills both properties:19  
( ) ( )xEKEKxAf xEk E
E
K
K
EKX δδδ α
γα
α
εα
γαεαα expexpexp .
















=
++
++
  (15) 
The exponential portion of the expression allows for variable substitution while at the 
same time keeping essentiality of all inputs. As it turns out, the transcendental 
approximation yields analytical solutions only if production is log-linear in energy 
                                                 
19 The transcendental approximation has been chosen from a complete list of specifications reviewed by 
Griffin et al. There they summarized functional forms used in empirical work and discussed their 
properties.  
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(i.e. 0=Eδ ). We will discuss the implications of this constraint as we derive the 
parameters that describe features of this technology.   
Parameters we use to describe important features of technology in the transcendental 
specification are: 
o Capital elasticity of production is 
( ) ( )







 +
++=
+
K
K
K
Kd
fd
K
kk
k
α
εα
α
εαδ
εα
ln
.ln
and energy 
elasticity of production is 
( )
γα += E
Ed
fd
ln
.ln
. Note that the capital production elasticity is a 
function of K  but the energy production elasticity is not a function of E   due to the 
assumption  that  output is a log-linear function of energy ( Eδ = 0). Therefore this 
assumption implies constant energy production elasticity.  
o Elasticity of Scale is ( ) ( ) ( )







 +
++++++
+
K
K
Kx
K
K
kxEKX
α
εα
α
εα
δδγαεαα  . The 
elasticity of scale is not affected by the level of energy used due to the assumption Eδ = 0. 
o Elasticity of substitution. The analytical expression for the capital-energy Morishima 
elasticity of substitution ( MKEσ ) is cumbersome in this case. However under this 
specification, it is an algebraic matter to show that )(<>MKEσ 1 if and only if )(<>kδ 0, 
and 0<
∂
∂
K
M
KE
α
σ
 and 0>
∂
∂
E
M
KE
α
σ
. 
o The rate of technological change is: ( ) ( ) ( ) ε
α
δ
γε KKEkAdRTC
K
K lnlnln)ln( +++= . 
A relaxation of the assumption Eδ = 0 would change the shape of the relationship 
between RTC and energy (E). 
  
 
23 
o Technical change is capital (energy) biased if 
( ) ( )( )
EkK
Kk
K
KK
IBTC
α
γ
ε
δα
αδ
−





+
++
=
−
−
1
1 ln1/
0)(<> .  This is constant with respect to E  due 
to the assumption Eδ = 0. 
Based on parameters above we infer that this approximation to the technology not only 
allows for non-neutral technological progress but it permits technological progress to 
affect the elasticity of substitution. Just as with the Cobb Douglas approximation we will 
now derive conditions for the existence of a positive sustainable consumption 
(Proposition 2), obtain an expression for maximum sustainable consumption, and discuss 
the role of different economic forces on sustainability. 
PROPOSITION 2. Consider an economy using exhaustible energy, with no capital 
depreciation ( )0=λ  and a transcendental technology with endogenous factor augmenting 
technical change ( )








=
+
++ K
K
EKX KEKxAf k
α
εα
γαεαα δexp .  where ε ,γ ≥0. Then the 
viability kernel depends on parameters as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } K K,  such that S V , ,     if  and 0, , , ,
                                                            otherwise 
b b E
b b
S K K c S
Viab K x r c S
α ε α γ δ ≥ + < + >
= 
∅
 
Where  ( ), , , ,b bV K x r c S  is a function defined by: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 11
K
K
, , , ,
1,
K K
EX
K E
E E
E
b b
E
E b
K
V K x r c S
A x Cb a F K S
α α ε
α γα α ε α γ
α γ α γα γ
α γ α
α γ
δ α ε
 +
−  − +
+ +−   − + ++
=
 +
 + Γ + +   + 
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Where ( )[ ]KFa ,1+Γ  is the upper incomplete gamma function20 with 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )εα
ε
γα
α
α
εα
γα
δ +
−
+
−+








+
=
KE
K
K
K
KKF
E
K  as the lower limit of integration.  
Proof: see Appendix A.2. 
An energy elasticity of production greater than that of capital, ( ) ( )E Kα γ α ε+ > + , and 
K 0δ >  are necessary and sufficient conditions for non emptiness of the viability kernel 
or, equivalently, existence of a positive sustainable consumption. This is a somewhat 
surprising result for two reasons. First technological progress, regardless of rate and bias, 
is not sufficient to guarantee existence. Second, in contrast to the Cobb Douglas case in 
which capital-augmenting technical change enhanced sustainability, it is energy-
augmenting technical change that increases the likelihood of existence. Therefore 
allowing technological progress to affect capital-energy elasticity of substitution results 
in conclusions opposite to those obtained under a constant elasticity of substitution. The 
causes of this reversal will be explored later in our numerical simulation. 
Combination of our definition of MSC with the viability kernel derived in Proposition 2 
yields the following expression for maximum sustainable consumption: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( )* 01 ,
b
a bc bKa b b
TRA K E E
K
c A x S d K
α ε
δ α γ α γ
α
− +
 = − + + Γ   
 
  (16) 
Where: a = ( )
1
1 Eα γ− + , b =
( )
( )γα
γα
+−
+
E
E
1 , c = ( )
( ) ( )
( ) 







+−
+−+
+ εα
εαγα
εα
α
K
KE
K
K
1
, d = ( ) ( )
( )( )
K
K
K E
E
α α γ α ε
α ε α γ
 + − + 
+ +
 
                                                 
20 For a complex number z with positive real part the Gamma function is defined by ( ) ∫=Γ
∞
−−
0
1 dtetz tz . 
The upper incomplete gamma function is a particular case of the gamma function in which the lower limit 
of integration is different from zero: ( ) ∫=Γ
∞
−−
x
tz dtetxz 1, . 
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Given the complicated nature of technological parameters it is hard to draw conclusions 
on the role of different forces in sustainability. However it is clear from (16) that, in 
addition to conditions derived in Proposition 2, a positive sustainable consumption exists 
if ( ) 1Eα γ+ < . This is consistent with the Cobb Douglas case in the sense that a high 
energy augmenting technical change, i.e. 1 Eγ α≥ − , may harm sustainability. Moreover 
maximum sustainable consumption increases with Hicks-neutral technological progress, 
with resource endowment (
0S ), and with non energy inputs, x . The role of biased 
technological progress on maximum sustainable consumption is not clear from this 
analytical expression and will be addressed later through numerical simulations. 
Finally existence requires K 0δ >  which, as mentioned before, implies a capital-energy 
elasticity of substitution greater than one. Under CES an elasticity of substitution greater 
than one was sufficient for existence while under variable elasticity of substitution (VES) 
it is necessary. This is not surprising once one realizes that the approximation with VES 
preserves essentiality of the resource while this is not the case with a CES approximation. 
This result confirms our suspicions that whenever essentiality of inputs is preserved more 
substitutability is required to guarantee existence of a positive sustainable consumption.  
 
5. Computation of Maximum Sustainable Consumption for the U.S. Economy 
We estimate the parameters of the technology based on Jorgenson’s KLEM (capital, 
labor, energy21 and materials) data set for the U.S. economy (Jorgenson 2007).22 This 
                                                 
21 Energy includes coal mining, petroleum & gas mining, petroleum refining, electric utilities, and gas 
utilities. Although Jorgenson has data on total energy rather than non-renewable energy sources, when we 
compare this data to the data from the DOE,  non-renewable energy accounts for 93.3% of the shares in 
total energy used in production. Assuming all energy used is non-renewable is not extremely harmful.  
22 Available online at: 
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data consist of a panel covering 35 sectors of the US economy from 1960 to 2005. To 
estimate the aggregate technology in this economy we construct aggregate indexes of 
inputs (capital, labor, and energy) and output (material) in each year. Specifically, we 
aggregate inputs and output across 35 sectors in each year using a Cobb Douglas 
aggregator function where coefficients are given by the share of each individual element 
on total value. 
The technology of this economy may be described by a production possibilities frontier 
combining all four aggregates. We further assume separability between materials and the 
rest of the elements which allows us to model the aggregate technology with a production 
function where production of materials23 is a function of primary inputs (labor and 
capital) and intermediate inputs (energy).24 Separability across inputs and output implied 
by aggregation procedures and existence of an aggregate production function may bias 
estimations. However it is not our purpose here to find the best fit for the US aggregate 
technology but rather explore the role of different types of technological progress on 
MSC and assuming existence of an aggregate production function greatly simplifies our 
illustration. 
We fit a Cobb Douglas and transcendental approximations to these data. The estimated 
parameters serve as basis for testing sustainability conditions derived in Propositions 1 
and 2 and also provide a plausible starting point around which to simulate changes in 
technology. Parameter estimates were obtained with MATLAB25 and the results are 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jorgenson/faces/study/StudyPage.jsp?studyId=18782&tab=files&studyLis
tingIndex=2_34b20438e7071dea36e7852bed3f  
23 This aggregate includes production from agriculture, metallic and non-metallic materials, services, 
textile-apparels, wood-paper, other services, other metals, machinery, and equipment. 
24 Existence of an aggregate production function implies that production functions of all sectors are 
identical up to a scalar multiple (Denny (1972) and Hall (1973)).  
25 Programs are included in Appendix B. 
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reported in Appendix B. We have tested conditions for existence of a positive sustainable 
consumption under both approximations. Existence conditions with a CD specification 
(  K Eα ε α γ+ > + and 1Eα γ+ <  from Proposition 1) could not be rejected. The impact of 
different types of technical change on MSC is clear (it increases (decreases) with capital 
(energy) augmenting technical change) from equation (14) and so, there is no need for 
numerical simulation. 
On the other hand existence conditions (  K Eα ε α γ+ > + and 1Eα γ+ <  from 
Proposition 2) are rejected at 1% level of significance when technology is approximated 
with a transcendental specification.26 This in turn implies that maximum sustainable 
consumption is zero.  
The goal of this study is to explore the link between maximum sustainable consumption 
and different types of technological progress better captured by a transcendental 
approximation. This link is not clear from equation (16) and so numerical simulations are 
needed. To be able to simulate maximum sustainable consumption we will impose 
sustainability (
K 1Eα ε α γ+ < + < ) by setting Eα =0.3, which is higher than 0.2724, the 
estimated value of 
Kα . After imposing sustainability we use equation (16) to simulate 
different rates and directions of technical change and maximum sustainable consumption.  
Computation of MSC with a transcendental approximation ( *TRAc ) is conducted for the 
year 2005. The stock of non renewable energy 0S  was calculated with data from the US 
                                                 
26 Since the CD specification is nested into the transcendental we conducted an F-test of the hypothesis 
0=Kδ  (i.e. the restriction that would support a CD approximation). The hypothesis was rejected at the 0.01 
level of significance which offers support to the use of transcendental approximation over a CD (but not 
necessarily over other more flexible specifications) to model this economy.   
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Department of Energy (DOE).27 The procedure to calculate 0S  consists of constructing 
an index aggregating all non-renewable energy sources (measured in Million British 
Thermal Units, MBTUs). For consistency with our previous aggregation procedure we 
calculate a Cobb Douglas function of the different energy sources where coefficients for 
each source are shares in total MBTUs used in production.28 This of course implies that 
we are calculating MSC based on US own resources and that total non-renewable energy 
used annually in production is extracted from US reserves and no imports occur. This is 
far from truth since almost 70% of non-renewable energy used by the US is imported. 
However the issue we are addressing here is the maximum level of consumption that can 
be sustained by the US economy with its own energy resources. 
 
6. Technological Progress, Substitutability and MSC: Transcendental 
Approximation 
Our goal in this section is to isolate the effect of Hicks-neutral technical change (RTC), 
the input bias of technical change (IBTC) and of the elasticity of substitution (ES) on 
MSC. Three simulations are conducted within the framework of the transcendental 
specification, aiming at isolating the effects of technological change and substitutability 
on MSC. Simulations were conducted using the mesh routine in MATLAB. 
Figure 2 captures the relationship between the Hicks-neutral rate of technical change29 
(RTC) and MSC. An increase in RTC increases MSC. The sensitivity of MSC to RTC is 
good news for the economy. This result calls for optimism in the analysis of 
                                                 
27 Stock of different sources of energy can be found in http://www.eia.doe.gov/. 
28 Results are reported in Appendix D. 
29 Changes in Hicks-neutral rate of technical change are achieved through changes in A keeping everything 
else constant. 
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sustainability but we should keep in mind that while Hicks-neutral technical change can 
increase MSC it can not guarantee existence. An example of such a change would be an 
upgrade of the power transmission system regardless of the energy source. 
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Figure 2. eutral Technical Change and MSC (Transcendental) 
 
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between MSC and non-neutral technical change with a 
transcendental approximation. Consistent with the CD case, capital-augmenting technical 
change increases MSC. However, in contrast to the CD case, an energy-augmenting 
technical change also increases MSC.  
The intuition behind this result is easily understood looking at Figure 4. Although 
energy-augmenting technical change, by increasing the productivity of energy relative to 
that of capital, may tend to reduce the ability of society to substitute capital for energy, it 
also enhances substitutability asymptotically by flattening the isoquant between capital 
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and energy. The latter effect is strong enough to outweigh the former rendering the 
positive relationship between energy-augmenting technical progress and MSC.  
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10
7
 
Capital Augmenting
Technical Change
Energy Augmenting
Technical Change
 
M
a
x
im
u
m
 S
u
s
ta
in
a
b
le
 C
o
n
s
u
m
p
tio
n
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
x 10
7
 
Figure 3. on eutral Technical Change and MSC 
 
The effect of technical change on substitutability is neglected in the CD specification 
(due to constancy of elasticity of substitution) yielding a negative relationship between 
energy-augmenting technical progress and MSC. Therefore this result clearly illustrates 
how the inflexibility of a CD specification handicaps our understanding of sustainability 
since it neglects the wide range of substitutions usually displayed by real economies. 
Therefore development and higher diffusion of technologies such as fossil-fired 
combined heat and power, smart grid, and other technologies achieving efficiency gains 
in the use of exhaustible energy may in fact enhance sustainability. 
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Figure 4. on eutral Technical Change and Capital-Energy Substitution  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Policies aimed at reducing use of fossil energy per unit of output incentivize the 
deployment of new technologies that may affect the productivity of exhaustible energy 
relative to that of other inputs, most importantly capital, that substitute for it. This in turn 
may affect the ability of society to reduce the use of energy and sustain consumption in 
the long run. A clear understanding of the effect of new technologies on substitution 
possibilities and the resulting impact on sustainable consumption is critical in evaluating 
these policies. Previous studies of sustainable consumption ruled out any effect of 
technological progress on relative productivities and substitution elasticities which 
handicaps evaluation of energy policies. This paper is an attempt to correct this problem 
by allowing for biased technological progress and variable elasticity of substitution.   
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Allowing technological progress to affect relative factor productivities (biased technical 
change) within a Cobb Douglas approximation to technology has rendered new insights. 
Only capital augmenting technological change can guarantee the existence of a positive 
sustainable consumption. Moreover capital augmenting technical change increases 
maximum sustainable consumption while resource augmenting technical change 
decreases it. Finally although Hicks-neutral technical change can not achieve existence, it 
increases maximum sustainable consumption provided a positive sustainable 
consumption exists. This suggests that more resources should be allocated to 
development and diffusion of technologies such as first and second generation biofuels 
and other sources of renewable energy. 
We have taken the analysis one step further by allowing for technological progress to 
affect substitution possibilities between capital and energy. This was achieved by 
approximating technology with a transcendental production function. This extension 
yielded results that reverse those previously derived in the literature. In particular a 
capital-energy elasticity of substitution greater than one is a necessary condition for 
existence of a positive sustainable consumption in contrast to the CES approximation for 
which it is sufficient. This indicates that when inputs are essential in production more 
substitutability is required to achieve sustainability. Moreover with flexible substitution, 
resource augmenting technical change increases the likelihood of existence of a positive 
sustainable consumption. This reverses the conclusion obtained when using a Cobb 
Douglas approximation which indicated that capital augmenting technical change 
enhanced sustainability. This is due to the positive effect of energy augmenting technical 
change on capital-energy elasticity of substitution (i.e. the curvature of the isoquant), 
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effect neglected under constant elasticity of substitution. This result suggests that, in 
addition to technologies mentioned above, resources should also be allocated to 
technologies such as fossil-fired combined heat and power and smart grid. 
Finally since technological progress may enhance or damage sustainability depending 
on its effect on substitution possibilities more research aimed at a better understanding 
and measurement of the impact of technological progress on substitution possibilities is 
needed. 
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Appendix A.A.  Proof of Proposition I. 
With a Cobb Douglas approximation the production function can be denoted by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , K L Ef A K L E A K L Eα ε α α γ+ +=  
Therefore: 
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E
V
K f
∂
= −
∂
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
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K E L
E b bE A K E L
α ε α γ α
α γ
+ +−+
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Where ( ).Ef  is the marginal product of energy and the subscript b  in E denotes 
“boundary” level of E. 
At the minimum ( ,b bc E ), ( )( ). 0b b
V
f c K E
K
λ
∂
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Plugging (1) in (2) yields:  
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Our viability kernel is depicted by: 
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( )( )
1
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, , ,
b b b
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f A A E c A K A L
∞
= +∫      (4) 
Plugging (3) in (1) and the resulting expression in (4) yields: 
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Solving the integral yields: 
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Therefore the minimum level of resource stock needed to sustain consumption at bc  (i.e. 
( )V , ,b bK c S ) will be finite if only if 
( ) ( )
( )
E K
E
α γ α ε
α γ
+ − +
+
 is negative. This will in turn hold 
whenever ( ) ( )K Eα ε α γ+ > + . Provided this condition holds the integral can be solved 
and the viability kernel can be expressed as: 
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  (5) 
But then again ( )V K  will be positive and finite if and only if ( ) 1Eα γ+ < .  
Summarizing, any positive level of consumption bc  is sustainable if the resource stock 
required to sustain it indefinitely is finite. This will in turn be true if and only if the 
viability kernel is not empty for bc . Conditions for this are ( ) 1Eα γ+ <  and 
( ) ( )
( )
E K
E
α γ α ε
α γ
+ − +
+
<0 and, therefore, we call them non-emptiness conditions or NEC■ 
 
Maximum Sustainable Consumption 
The maximum level of sustainable consumption will be achieved if we allow the stock of 
the natural resource to converge to zero asymptotically. In addition to compute this level 
we need to find the bc  that corresponds to the existing stock of natural resource 0S . 
Therefore we set ( ) 0V , , 0b bK c S S= =  and the viability kernel can now be denoted as: 
  
 
37 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0 0
1
EL
E K
EE
Eb
K E E
cA L
S K
α γα
α γ α εα γα γ
α γ
α ε α γ α γ
− +
− + − +++
+
 
= + 
 + − +  − +  
   (6) 
Solving for bc  in equation (6) yields: 
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Appendix A.B.  Proof of Proposition II. 
 
With a transcendental approximation the production function can be denoted by: 
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Where ( ).Ef  is the marginal product of energy and the subscript b  in E denotes 
“boundary” level of E. 
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Our viability kernel is depicted by: 
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. After the transformation the viability kernel can be expressed as: 
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The upper incomplete gamma function is finite if and only if 1 0a+ > . This implies that 
( ) ( )E K
E
α γ α ε
α γ
+ − +
+
>0. In addition the kernel is positive and finite if and only if 
( )1 Eα γ> +  and 0Kδ > ■ 
 
Maximum Sustainable Consumption 
The maximum level of sustainable consumption will be achieved if we allow the stock of 
the natural resource to converge to zero asymptotically. In addition to compute this level 
we need to find the bc  that corresponds to the existing stock of natural resource 0S . 
Therefore we set ( ) 0V , , 0b bK c S S= =  and the viability kernel can now be denoted as: 
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Solving for bc  in equation (6) yields: 
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Appendix B: Programs for Econometric Estimation 
 
Aggregation of inputs and output 
Aggregate level of material or inputs (capital, labor, and energy) in period t is calculated 
as: 
( )
35
1
exp lnt t ti ik ik
k
x xα
=
 
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 
∑  
Where tix  is the aggregate level of material or input i (capital, labor, and energy) used at 
time t, tikx  is the level of material or input i used in sector k at time t, and 
t
ikα  is the share 
of material or input i used in sector k on the total value of material or input i in t.  
 
Cobb Douglas: 
The equation to be estimated is:  
ln ln ln lnk L Em K L Eα α α= + +  
 
A=[10.1977 11.6291 9.8724 
10.2567 11.6484 9.8983 
10.2514 11.6753 9.9387 
10.2852 11.7056 9.9603 
10.3421 11.7174 9.9882 
10.3823 11.7446 10.0108 
10.4316 11.7788 10.0673 
10.5267 11.7849 10.1431 
10.5970 11.8032 10.2113 
10.7041 11.8275 10.2624 
10.7927 11.8322 10.3083 
10.8087 11.8389 10.3166 
10.8463 11.8557 10.3393 
10.9254 11.8946 10.3552 
10.9785 11.8808 10.3871 
10.9474 11.8662 10.3994 
10.9317 11.8506 10.4520 
10.9798 11.9209 10.4979 
11.0675 11.9855 10.5007 
11.1236 12.0450 10.5987 
11.1956 12.0493 10.7132 
11.2245 12.0832 10.6798 
11.2994 12.0690 10.6558 
11.3620 12.1644 10.5675 
  
 
40 
11.3794 12.2370 10.6100 
11.4714 12.2862 10.5325 
11.5576 12.3198 10.3046 
11.5921 12.3855 10.3740 
11.6541 12.4234 10.3407 
11.6621 12.4856 10.3729 
11.7287 12.5307 10.4561 
11.8004 12.5226 10.3809 
11.8520 12.5395 10.3680 
11.8872 12.5895 10.3625 
11.8904 12.6331 10.3462 
11.9345 12.6777 10.3454 
11.9617 12.7044 10.4195 
12.0158 12.7438 10.3494 
12.0923 12.7837 10.3519 
12.1491 12.8151 10.4116 
12.2222 12.8388 10.6280 
12.2633 12.8587 10.4474 
12.3246 12.8548 10.4454 
12.3307 12.8903 10.4177 
12.3385 12.9267 10.4629 
12.3349 12.9441 10.5058]; 
 
m=[11.2372 
11.2592 
11.3117 
11.3603 
11.4046 
11.4680 
11.5240 
11.5539 
11.6109 
11.6569 
11.6517 
11.6993 
11.7712 
11.8347 
11.8187 
11.7617 
11.8000 
11.8707 
11.9300 
11.9594 
11.9088 
11.9231 
11.9167 
  
 
41 
11.9450 
12.0127 
12.0621 
12.1089 
12.1710 
12.2029 
12.2143 
12.2470 
12.2405 
12.2958 
12.3364 
12.3865 
12.4374 
12.5030 
12.5564 
12.6396 
12.7007 
12.7557 
12.7518 
12.7618 
12.7877 
12.8252 
12.8557]; 
X1 = [A(:,1) A(:,2) A(:,3)]; 
regstats(m,X1,'linear') 
Where m is materials, A(:,1) is natural log of capital, A(:,2) is natural log of labor, A(:,3), 
and is natural log of energy. 
 
Transcendental: 
The equation to be estimated is: 
ln ln ln lnk L E km K L E Kα α α δ= + + +  
 
B=[10.1977 11.6291 9.8724  26842 
10.2567 11.6484 9.8983  28474 
10.2514 11.6753 9.9387  28323 
10.2852 11.7056 9.9603  29295 
10.3421 11.7174 9.9882  31011 
10.3823 11.7446 10.0108 32283 
10.4316 11.7788 10.0673 33913 
10.5267 11.7849 10.1431 37297 
10.5970 11.8032 10.2113 40015 
10.7041 11.8275 10.2624 44538 
10.7927 11.8322 10.3083 48663 
10.8087 11.8389 10.3166 49450 
10.8463 11.8557 10.3393 51344 
10.9254 11.8946 10.3552 55568 
  
 
42 
10.9785 11.8808 10.3871 58601 
10.9474 11.8662 10.3994 56804 
10.9317 11.8506 10.4520 55924 
10.9798 11.9209 10.4979 58678 
11.0675 11.9855 10.5007 64053 
11.1236 12.0450 10.5987 67752 
11.1956 12.0493 10.7132 72810 
11.2245 12.0832 10.6798 74942 
11.2994 12.0690 10.6558 80776 
11.3620 12.1644 10.5675 85995 
11.3794 12.2370 10.6100 87504 
11.4714 12.2862 10.5325 95932 
11.5576 12.3198 10.3046 104567 
11.5921 12.3855 10.3740 108242 
11.6541 12.4234 10.3407 115158 
11.6621 12.4856 10.3729 116086 
11.7287 12.5307 10.4561 124084 
11.8004 12.5226 10.3809 133303 
11.8520 12.5395 10.3680 140362 
11.8872 12.5895 10.3625 145399 
11.8904 12.6331 10.3462 145865 
11.9345 12.6777 10.3454 152442 
11.9617 12.7044 10.4195 156644 
12.0158 12.7438 10.3494 165342 
12.0923 12.7837 10.3519 178489 
12.1491 12.8151 10.4116 188933 
12.2222 12.8388 10.6280 203259 
12.2633 12.8587 10.4474 211776 
12.3246 12.8548 10.4454 225159 
12.3307 12.8903 10.4177 226542 
12.3385 12.9267 10.4629 228317 
12.3349 12.9441 10.5058 227489]; 
 
m=[11.2372 
11.2592 
11.3117 
11.3603 
11.4046 
11.4680 
11.5240 
11.5539 
11.6109 
11.6569 
11.6517 
11.6993 
11.7712 
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11.8347 
11.8187 
11.7617 
11.8000 
11.8707 
11.9300 
11.9594 
11.9088 
11.9231 
11.9167 
11.9450 
12.0127 
12.0621 
12.1089 
12.1710 
12.2029 
12.2143 
12.2470 
12.2405 
12.2958 
12.3364 
12.3865 
12.4374 
12.5030 
12.5564 
12.6396 
12.7007 
12.7557 
12.7518 
12.7618 
12.7877 
12.8252 
12.8557]; 
X2 = [B(:,1) B(:,2) B(:,3) B(:,4)]; 
regstats(m,X2,'linear') 
 
Where m is materials, A(:,1) is natural log of capital, A(:,2) is natural log of labor, A(:,3), 
is natural log of energy, and A(:,4) is capital. 
 
Appendix C: Parameter Estimates 
Cobb Douglas 
      Parameter          Estimate          p-Value 
   α (intercept)  0.8593587 0.6501 
Kα              0.3567364 0.0255 
Lα              0.4809408 0.032  
Eα              0.1219218 0.0251  
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Transcendental 
      Parameter  Estimate p-Value  
   α (intercept)  4.856676      0.0075 
Kα   0.272387 0.0375 
Lα   0.137028 0.4718 
Eα   0.203681 0.023 
Kδ   0.0000031 1.7E-4 
 
Appendix D: Programs for Simulations 
 
Stock of Fossil Energy 
(1) 
Sources 
(2) 
2005  
Unitsa 
(3) 
btus  
per unit 
(4) 
Total  
btus 
(5) 
MMBTU 
=(4) / 1 million 
(6) 
Shares 
=(5) / 1.2E+12 
Coal (short tons) 1.9E+10 20355372 3.9E+17 3.9E+11 0.334 
Oil (barrels) 2.2E+10 5800000 1.3E+17 1.3E+11 0.109 
gas 1 (cubic feet) 2.0E+14 1020 2.1E+17 2.1E+11 0.180 
gas 2 (cubic feet) 2.1E+14 1020 2.2E+17 2.2E+11 0.188 
gas 3 (cubic feet) 1.9E+14 1020 1.9E+17 1.9E+11 0.163 
gas 4 (cubic feet) 2.8E+13 1020 2.9E+16 2.9E+10 0.025 
gas 5 (cubic feet) 3.4E+10 1020 3.5E+13 3.5E+07 0.000 
Total     1.2E+18 1.2E+12   
Aggregate Index         2.3E+11
b 
a Data available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/ . 
b Calculated as y=exp(∑i si*xi) where xis are quantities for each source in column 5 and si are shares in last 
column. 
 
-------------- 
TRANSCENDENTAL 
-------------- 
 
 
******************************* 
MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION 
******************************* 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A=1; So=2.28712E+11;  K=227489; L=418361; E=36527; M=1; lnk=12.33; lnl=12.94; 
lne=10.505; alphak=0.27238; alphal=0.137028; alphae=0.20368; alpham=0; 
deltak=0.00000311; epsilon=0; gamma=0; 
 
Sustainability rejected then imposed (alphae=0.3) and simulated: 
 
********************************************************** 
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND HICKS-NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE 
********************************************************** 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
A=[1:0.0001:2.7182]; So=2.28712E+11;  K=227489; L=418361; E=36527; lnk=12.33; 
lnl=12.94; lne=10.505; alphak=0.27238; alphal=0.137028; alphae=0.3; 
deltak=0.00000311; epsilon=0; gamma=0; 
Cb=(A.^(1./(1-(alphae+gamma)))).*(So.^((alphae+gamma)./(1-(alphae+gamma)))).*((1-
(alphae+gamma)).^(1./(1-(alphae+gamma)))).*((alphae+gamma).^(((alphae+gamma)-
(alphak+epsilon))./(alphae+gamma))).*((alphak+epsilon)./(alphak)).^((alphae+gamma)./(
1-(alphae+gamma))).*(deltak).^((alphak./(alphak+epsilon)).*((((alphae+gamma)-
(alphak+epsilon))./(1-(alphae+gamma))))).*(L.^(alphal./(1-
(alphae+gamma)))).*(gammainc(((deltak./(alphae+gamma)).*(K.^((alphak+epsilon)./alp
hak))),-alphak./(alphae+gamma)-epsilon./(alphak+epsilon)+1,'upper')).^(-
((alphae+gamma)./(1-(alphae+gamma)))); 
x=log(A); 
plot(x,Cb) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
 
******************************************************** 
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND NON-NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE 
******************************************************** 
Coefficients epsilon and gamma are not estimated but rather simulated based on 
programs below 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
A=1; So=2.28712E+11;  K=227489; L=418361; E=36527; lnk=12.33; lnl=12.94; 
lne=10.505; alphak=0.27238; alphal=0.137028; alphae=0.3; deltak=0.00000311; 
  
[epsilon,gamma] = meshgrid(0:.00005:0.01,0:.00005:0.025); 
*we assume epsilon and gamma start at zero and we simulate small positive changes 
(technological progress) * 
Cb=(A.^(1./(1-(alphae+gamma)))).*(So.^((alphae+gamma)./(1-(alphae+gamma)))).*((1-
(alphae+gamma)).^(1./(1-(alphae+gamma)))).*((alphae+gamma).^(((alphae+gamma)-
(alphak+epsilon))./(alphae+gamma))).*((alphak+epsilon)./(alphak)).^((alphae+gamma)./(
1-(alphae+gamma))).*(deltak).^((alphak./(alphak+epsilon)).*((((alphae+gamma)-
(alphak+epsilon))./(1-(alphae+gamma))))).*(L.^(alphal./(1-
(alphae+gamma)))).*(gammainc(((deltak./(alphae+gamma)).*(K.^((alphak+epsilon)./alp
hak))),-alphak./(alphae+gamma)-epsilon./(alphak+epsilon)+1,'upper')).^(-
((alphae+gamma)./(1-(alphae+gamma)))); 
mesh(epsilon,gamma,Cb) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
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************************************************************************
*********** 
ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AND NON-NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE 
************************************************************************
*********** 
 
A=1; So=2.28712E+11;  K=227489; L=418361; E=36527; M=1; lnk=12.33; lnl=12.94; 
lne=10.505; alphak=0.27238; alphal=0.137028; alphae=0.3; alpham=0; 
deltak=0.00000311;  
[epsilon,gamma] = meshgrid(0:.0002:0.01,0:.0002:0.025); 
y=A.*(L.^alphal).*(K.^(alphak+epsilon)).*(E.^(alphae+gamma)).*exp(deltak.*K.^((alph
ak+epsilon)./alphak)); 
F=(alphak+epsilon).*(K.^-1)+deltak.*((alphak+epsilon)./alphak).*(K.^(epsilon./alphak)); 
G=-(alphak+epsilon).*(K.^-
2)+deltak.*((alphak+epsilon)./alphak).*(epsilon./alphak).*(K.^((epsilon-
alphak)./alphak)); 
D=(alphae+gamma).*(E.^-1); 
 
fk=F.*y; 
fl=alphal.*(L.^-1).*y; 
fe=D.*y; 
fkk=G.*y+(F.^2).*y; 
fkl=F.*alphal.*(L.^-1).*y; 
fke=D.*F.*y; 
fll=-alphal.*(L.^-2).*y+alphal.*(L.^-1).*alphal.*(L.^-1).*y; 
fle=alphal.*(L.^-1).*D.*y; 
fel=fle; 
fee=-(alphae+gamma).*(E.^-2).*y+(alphae+gamma).*(E.^-1).*D.*y; 
fek=fke; 
 
Q1=-fk.*(fk.*fll.*fee+fkl.*fel.*fe+fek.*fle.*fl-fek.*fll.*fe-(fel.^2).*fk-fl.*fkl.*fee); 
Q2=fkk.*(2.*fl.*fle.*fe-(fe.^2).*fll-(fl.^2).*fee); 
Q3=-fkl.*(fl.*fek.*fe+fe.*fle.*fk-(fe.^2).*fkl-fee.*fk.*fl); 
Q4=fke.*(fek.*(fl.^2)+fk.*fe.*fll-fe.*fl.*fkl-fk.*fl.*fel); 
d=(Q1+Q2+Q3+Q4); 
 
Q5=(fk.*fll.*fe+(fl.^2).*fke-fe.*fl.*fkl-fk.*fl.*fel); 
dek=(Q5); 
sigmake=((K.*fk+L.*fl+E.*fe)./(K.*E)).*(dek./d); 
 
Q6=(2.*fk.*fkl.*fl-(fl.^2).*fkk-(fk.^2).*fll); 
 
dee=(Q6); 
sigmaee=((K.*fk+L.*fl+E.*fe)./(E.*E)).*(dee./d); 
sigmaMke=((fe.*E)./(K.*fk+L.*fl+E.*fe)).*(sigmake-sigmaee); 
mesh(epsilon,gamma,sigmaMke) 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EVIROMETAL EFFICIECY AMOG COR ETHAOL PLATS 
 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. corn ethanol industry has benefited from government support due to its 
potential to achieve a rather wide set of goals: mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG), achieving energy security (diversifying energy sources), improving farm incomes 
and fostering rural development among others. Continuation of policy support, however, 
is being debated due to doubts about the direct and indirect GHG effects of the industry. 
Moreover, the capacity of the industry to reduce GHG emissions per gallon of ethanol 
produced may also determine the opportunities opened to it in future carbon markets and 
in the National Renewable Fuel Standard program. This study provides information 
relevant to these issues by measuring the environmental performance of the industry in 
terms of GHG emissions and the economic cost (shadow price) of GHG reductions.  
Input requirements and byproducts’ yield per gallon of ethanol produced are critical 
in determining environmental performance. Previous studies have addressed the issue of 
input requirements and byproducts’ yield of ethanol plants. Using engineering data 
McAloon et al. (2000) and Kwiatkowski et al. (2006) measured considerable 
improvement in plant efficiency between 2000 and 2006. Shapouri, et al. (2005) reported 
input requirements and cost data based on a USDA sponsored survey of plants for the 
year 2002. Wang et al. (2007) and Plevin et al. (2008), reported results based on 
spreadsheet models of the industry (GREET and BEACCON, respectively). Pimentel et 
al. (2005) and Eidman (2007) reported average performances of plants although they do 
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not clearly indicate the sources of their estimates. Finally Perrin et al. (2009) reported 
results on input requirements, operating costs, and operating revenues based on a survey 
of seven dry grind plants in the Midwest during 2006 and 2007. 
With the exception of Shapouri et al. (2005) and Perrin et al. (2009) all of these 
studies reported values corresponding to the average plant rather than to individual 
plants. In addition, it is generally believed that the industry has become more efficient 
and technologically homogeneous since 2005. Since the data used in Shapouri et al. 
(2005) was collected in 2002 it may not be representative of current technologies in the 
industry. In contrast to Shapouri et al. (2005), Perrin et al. (2009) surveyed plants in 
operation during 2006 and 2007 and employed a much more restrictive sampling criterion 
(discussed below) which yielded a modern and technologically homogenous sample of 
plants. This sample is believed to be more representative of current technologies and is, 
hence, our data of choice to assess the environmental performance of plants. Based on 
these data the present study evaluates the environmental efficiency of seven recently 
constructed ethanol plants in the North Central region of the U.S. The returns over 
operating costs (ROOC)30 that may be gained or lost by plants as a consequence of the 
effort to reach a given environmental target are also calculated and discussed. 
 
2. Materials and Method 
2.1. Data 
The environmental performance of a plant is evaluated on the basis of emission of 
greenhouse gases associated with its productive activity. Greenhouse gas emissions from 
                                                 
30 We evaluate economic performance based on returns over operating costs rather than profits. This is 
because capital costs are not included in our analysis. 
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plants were not directly measured but rather calculated based on observable inputs and 
outputs corresponding to each plant. In addition concerns regarding the environmental 
impact of ethanol production refer to life cycle31 GHG emissions and not only those 
emissions at the processing stage. Therefore we evaluate life cycle GHG emissions 
associated with observable inputs and outputs. Our observations consist of 33 quarterly 
reports of input and output quantities and prices from a sample of seven Midwest ethanol 
plants. Following the non parametric efficiency literature we refer to each observation as 
a decision making unit (DMU). Plants produce 3 outputs (ethanol, dry distillers grains 
with solubles (DDGS), and modified wet distillers grains with solubles (MWDGS)) using 
7 inputs32 (corn, natural gas, electricity, labor, denaturant, chemicals, and “other 
processing costs”). 
 
2.2. Ethanol Plants: Characteristics 
Table 1 presents some quarterly characteristics of the seven dry grind ethanol plants 
surveyed. According to Table 1 the plants produced an average rate equivalent to 53.1 
million gallons of ethanol per year, with a range from 42.5 million gallons per year to 
88.1 million gallons per year.  The period surveyed included the third quarter of 2006 
until the fourth quarter of 2007 (six consecutive quarters).  In addition plants could be 
differentiated by how much byproduct they sold as DDGS (10% moisture) compared to 
                                                 
31 “Life cycle” in this case includes emissions taking place at three stages of the production process: corn 
production (farmers), ethanol production (biorefinery), and feedlot (byproducts from ethanol plants are 
given a credit for replacing corn as feed in livestock production). 
32 Results of our survey contained total expenditures in labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing 
costs. As a result we calculated implicit quantities for these inputs dividing total expenditures by their 
corresponding price indexes. Labor and management price index associated to the Basic Chemical 
Manufacturing Industries was obtained from http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_325100.htm#b00-
0002. Denaturant, chemicals and other processing costs were calculated based on the Producer Input Price 
Index for “All other basic inorganic chemicals”, http://www.bls.gov/pPI/. 
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MWDGS (55% moisture). Variation on this variable was significant, averaging 54% of 
byproduct sold as DDGS, but ranging from one plant that sold absolutely no byproduct as 
DDGS to another plant that sold nearly all byproduct (97%) as DDGS. 
Finally, Table 1 briefly characterizes plant marketing strategies.  In purchasing input 
feedstock, five of the six plants purchased corn via customer contracts.  Similarly, in 
selling ethanol, five of the six plants used third parties or agents.  Byproduct marketing 
across plants displayed a higher degree of variance.  Marketing of DDGS was split fairly 
evenly between spot markets and third parties/agents.  An even higher variability was 
observed for MWDGS, where no one marketing strategy (spot market, customer contract, 
or third party/agent) was significantly more prevalent across plants than any other. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of inputs used and outputs produced by the 33 
DMUs in our sample. As mentioned before the basic observations in this study 
corresponds to a plant in a given quarter; so two quarters of the same plant are considered 
as two different observations as are two plants in the same quarter.  
 
2.3. Environmental Performance of Ethanol Plants 
2.3.1. Emissions Measurement 
No direct measurements of GHG emissions are available in this industry; however 
they can be calculated using engineering relationships. A number of computer packages 
have been developed to facilitate these calculations (Wang et al. 2007; Farrell et al. 
2006). We used the Biofuels Energy Systems Simulator33 (BESS). The BESS model 
includes all GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels used directly in crop 
                                                 
33 BESS is a software developed by a team of specialists in the Agronomy Department at the University of 
Nebraska, Lincoln (Liska, et al, 2009a, 2009b,  http://www.bess.unl.edu/ ) 
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production, grain transportation, biorefinery energy use, and coproduct transport. All 
upstream energy costs and associated GHG emissions with production of fossil fuels, 
fertilizer inputs, and electricity used in the production life cycle are also included. Since 
these calculations involve modeling of crop production and feedlot and these display 
regional differences, BESS includes regional scenarios and an average scenario for the 
whole Midwest region. Plants in our sample are scattered across the Midwest and, hence, 
we have used scenario 2 in BESS “US Midwest average UNL” which is deemed 
representative of the whole region. 
The BESS calculations of GHG emissions associated with a dry mill plant are 
equivalent to the following linear relationship: 
 0.00668274 0.063015823 0.0007445 0.000316916 
 0.4197522186 0.407868 
Mg c CG elect Eth
DDGS MWDGS
GHG x x x u
u u
= + + +
− −
        (1) 
Where MgGHG  represents megagrams of life cycle CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases, cx  
is bushels of corn used by the plant, DDGSu  and MWDGSu  are tons of byproduct sold as 
dried and modified wet respectively by the plant, CGx  is the total amount of natural gas 
used by the plant measured in MMBTUs, electx  is total amount of kilowatt hours (kwh) of 
electricity used by the plant, and Ethu  is the plant’s ethanol production in gallons.  
Eq. (1) states that a bushel of corn used in an ethanol plant is associated with about 
0.0067 megagrams of GHG emitted during the production of that bushel used in the 
biorefinery. DDGS and MWDGS have a positive and a negative component. The former 
is due to additional energy used in reducing moisture.34 The latter are “credits” attributed 
                                                 
34 In particular MWDGS require the use of electricity to centrifuge the wet byproduct and DDGS require 
the use of natural gas for heating and drying the wet byproduct. 
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to byproducts (i.e. reductions in GHG) due to the replacement of corn that would have 
been fed to livestock had the byproduct not been sold. The coefficient for ethanol 
production represents the combination of emissions associated with depreciable capital 
( 0.0002050 ) and freight for grain transportation ( 0.000111916 ), expressed on a per 
gallon basis. 
Eq. (1) includes outputs ( ), ,j j j jEth MWDGS DDGSu u u u= and a pollution increasing subset of 
all inputs used by ethanol plants35 denoted by ( ), ,j j j jp c CG electx x x x= , where subindex p 
indicates pollutant. We can now re express Eq. (1) in vector notation. To do so we 
partition inputs and outputs into a column vector of pollution increasing inputs and output 
( ), , ,j j j j jc CG elect Etha x x x u= ' and a column vector of pollution reducing byproducts 
( ),j j jb MWDGS DDGSu u u= '.  The level of greenhouse gas emissions associated with a particular 
plant j  as a function of observable inputs and outputs can be expressed as: 
j j j
bGHG a uα β= +          (2) 
Where ( )0.0066,0.0630,0.00074,0.000316α =  is the 1x4 row vector of coefficients 
associated with pollution increasing categories ja , and ( )0.419752, 0.407868β = − −  is 
the 1x2 row vector of coefficients associated with pollution reducing byproducts jbu . 
 
2.3.2. Characterization of Potential Ethanol Technology From Individual Plant Data 
Plants are constrained by a technology transforming a vector of C  inputs 
( ) CCxxxx +ℜ∈= ,...,, 21  into a vector of M  outputs ( ) MMuuuu +ℜ∈= ,...,, 21 . Observed 
                                                 
35 As described before ethanol plants use 7 inputs in production. However only three of them increase life-
cycle emissions of GHGs: corn, natural gas, and electricity. 
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combinations of inputs used and outputs produced ( ),j jx u  are taken to be representative 
points from the feasible ethanol technology.  In this study we use data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to infer the boundaries of the feasible technology set from the observed 
points, following the notation in Färe, et al.   
Observations from the technology consist of a sample of J  DMUs producing M  
outputs and using C  inputs. The production technology can be represented by a graph 
denoting the collection of all feasible input and output vectors: 
( ) ( ){ }, :C MGR x u x L u++= ∈ℜ ∈  
Where ( )uL , is the input correspondence which is defined as the collection of all input 
vectors Cx +ℜ∈  that yield at least output vector 
Mu +ℜ∈ . 
The frontier of the graph GR  and observed levels of inputs and outputs will serve as 
references for environmental efficiency assessment. 
 
2.3.3. Environmental Efficiency Measurement 
A given DMU is deemed more environmentally efficient whenever it chooses a 
feasible (subject to the graph) combination of inputs and byproducts (DDGS and 
MWDGS) that results in lower GHG emissions while maintaining its ethanol production 
level at the observed value denoted by jEthu . Fixing ethanol production to its observed 
level, and assuming variable returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs and 
outputs the graph can be denoted by: 
( ) ( )
33
1
, , , : , , , 1,  1,...,33j j j j j jEth b b Eth Eth
j
GR V S u x u u zM x zC zu u z j
=
 
= ≤ ≥ = = = 
 
∑         (3) 
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Where z  depicts a row vector of 33 intensity variables, bM  is the 33x2 matrix of 
observed byproducts, jbu  is the 1x2 vector of observed byproducts corresponding to the 
jth DMU, C  is the 33x7 matrix of observed inputs, , jx  is the 1x7 vector of observed 
inputs corresponding to the jth DMU, Ethu  is the 33x1 vector of observed outputs, and 
j
Ethu  is the observed ethanol production by observation j.  
We define the set of all combinations of corn, gas, electricity and byproducts that 
result in lower emissions than those actually produced by the thj  DMU as: 
( ) ( ){ }, , , :j j j j j j j j j jg p b Eth p b x p b x p bGHG x u u x u x u x uα β α β′ ′ ′= + ≤ +     (4)   
Where xα  is a subset of the vector α  previously defined which does not include the 
coefficient for ethanol, i.e. ( )0.006682,0.063015,0.000744xα =  and the rest is as 
before.36 
From Eq. (4) we can derive an isopollution line in DDGS and corn space, i.e. 
combinations of DDGS and corn that result in the same level of emissions keeping 
everything else constant. Fig. 1 depicts this set graphically in the corn and DDGS space 
(i.e. keeping everything else in the GHG equation fixed). The set jgGHG  consists of all 
those points above the isopollution line as indicated by the arrows with direction 
northwest. 
 
                                                 
36 We denote the coefficient associated with ethanol by γ =0.000316. Ethanol production and its associated 
coefficient are included in both sets. However, since ethanol is fixed at the observed level 
j
Ethu , the 
complete version of the inequality is 
j j j j j j
x p b Eth x p b Ethx u u x u uα β γ α β γ′ ′+ + ≤ + +  which after 
elimination is equivalent to the expression in (4). 
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Figure 1. Iso-pollution and Sets 
 
In Fig. 1 the feasible technology set is represented by a graph displaying variable 
returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs and outputs as indicated by the arrows 
moving from the frontier ( ( )DDGS cu f x= ) with direction southeast. As clearly seen in 
Fig. 1, the set jgGHG  includes combinations outside the graph and hence not attainable 
by DMUs in the sample. The subset of observations in jgGHG  that belong to the graph 
and are hence attainable by DMUs is depicted by the intersection of both sets delimited 
by the bold lines in Fig. 1: 
( ) ( ), , , ,j j j j jg p b Eth EthGHG x u u GR V S u∩        (5) 
The thj  DMU could choose any alternative production plan within the area denoted 
by the bold lines to produce its ethanol production level, achieving a reduction in 
emissions while simultaneously increasing DDGS or reducing corn or both. In this study, 
the environmental technically efficient projection of a given observation to the boundary 
of the technology set follows a hyperbolic path defined by equiproportional reductions in 
Iso-pollution DDGSu  
cx  
( ),j jc DDGSx u  
j
gGHG  ( )DDGS cu f x=  
( ),GR V S  
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inputs and increases in byproducts. The value of the proportionate change necessary to 
encounter the boundary, jgETE , is defined as the technical environmental efficiency of 
plant j: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }1, , min : ,   , ,j j j j j j jg p b Eth g p b EthETE x u u GHG x u GR V S uλ λ λ −= ∩ ≠ ∅  (6) 
Where λ  is a scalar defining the proportionate changes and the rest is as before. We 
calculated the value of ( ), ,j j j jg p b EthETE x u u  using MATLAB as indicated in Appendix A.  
Environmental technical efficiency defined in Eq. (6) is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the 
distance from ( ),j jc DDGSx u  to point A which corresponds to the environmental technically 
efficient allocation in corn and DDGS space. 
 
Figure 2. Environmental Technical Efficiency 
 
Note however that point A does not correspond to the minimum feasible GHG level 
since it does not coincide with the point of tangency between the isopollution and the 
cx  
 jIso pollution−  
DDGSu  
( ),j jc DDGSx u  
j
gGHG  
( )DDGS cu f x=  
( ), , jEthGR V S u  
  •A 
  •B 
 BIso pollution−  
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graph (point B). The allocation that achieves the minimum level of GHG emissions 
subject to the graph is called the overall environmental efficient allocation.  
Technically, we define this minimum feasible level of GHG emissions as: 
( ) ( ){ }
,
min  +     . .  ( , ) , ,  
p b
j j j j
Eth x p b Eth p b Eth
x u
GHG u GHG x u u s t x u GR V S uα β γ= = + ∈  (7) 
Where ( )j jEthGHG u  denotes minimum emissions attainable by j subject to observed 
ethanol production jEthu , px  is the vector of pollution increasing inputs, bu  is the vector 
of byproducts and the rest is as defined before. The empirical calculation of Eq. (7) is 
described in Appendix B. 
Overall environmental efficiency, jgE  , is measured by the hyperbolic distance 
between a given observation j and the isopollution line corresponding to ( )j jEthGHG u . 
The hyperbolic distance is computed through calculation of the reduction of observed 
inputs and equiproportional expansion of observed byproducts such that the isopollution 
corresponding to ( )j jEthGHG u  is reached. This is illustrated by Fig. 3 where overall 
environmental efficiency is the distance between ( ),j jc DDGSx u  and point C. 
The hyperbolic movement from ( ),j jc DDGSx u  to C results from the following technical 
relationship. 
PROPOSITION. The measure of overall environmental efficiency, jgE ,  is related to 
minimum GHG in the following manner: 
( ) 1          1, 2,...,j j j j jg p gGHG E x E b j Jα β
−
= + =      (8) 
See Proof in Appendix C. 
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Figure 3. Decomposition of Overall Environmental Efficiency 
 
 
We can decompose jgE  into purely technical environmental efficiency 
j
gETE   
(represented graphically by the distance between ( ),j jc DDGSx u  and A) and environmental 
allocative inefficiency jEAE  (represented graphically by the distance between A and C). 
Overall environmental efficiency can be expressed as: 
j j j
g g gE EAE ETE=          (9) 
Therefore, we can define allocative environmental inefficiency residually as:37 
j
gj
j
g
E
EAE
ETE
=          (10) 
Based on the solution to the problem described in Eq. (7) we calculate overall 
environmental efficiency by solving the implicit Eq. (8) for each observation. These 
                                                 
37 Environmental allocative inefficiency was illustrated in Fig. 2 by the distance between the iso-pollution 
corresponding to combination A  and iso-pollution corresponding to point D . 
   jIso pollution−  DDGSu  
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measures of environmental efficiency and their decomposition, Eq. (10), are calculated 
for our sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol plants and reported in Table 3. The 
minimum feasible GHG for each DMU as defined by Eq. (7) is calculated fixing ethanol 
production at observed levels.  
 
2.4. ROOC and Environmental Targets: Trade off or Complementarity? 
From Eq. (2) there is a clear relationship between GHG and the combination of inputs 
and byproducts. But there is also a relationship between combinations of inputs and 
byproducts and the level of ROOC. Therefore, in general, a change in GHG levels 
through reallocation of inputs and byproducts would bring about a change in ROOC. For 
a given level of ethanol production, the shadow price of GHG mitigation is the change in 
ROOC per unit change in GHG levels. The change in ROOC denotes the plant's 
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for a permit to emit GHG. We define the shadow 
price of a ton of GHG as:   
1 0
1 0 1 0
j j
j
GHG j j j j
WTP
SV
GHG GHG GHG GHG
π π−
= =
− −
           (11) 
Where WTP  is willingness to pay for changing emissions from 0
jGHG  to 1
jGHG . 0
jGHG  
denotes the original level of GHG and 0
jπ  the corresponding level of ROOC. 1
jGHG  is 
the “targeted” level of GHG and 1
jπ  denotes ROOC at this targeted level. GHG level will 
be targeted at the minimum GHG (i.e. 1
jGHG =
j
GHG ), or alternatively at the level 
corresponding to maximum achievable ROOC by firm j, *
jπ , which we designate as 
*
jGHG . 
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2.4.1. Shadow Cost from Observed to ROOC Maximizing Allocation 
We define the ROOC maximizing combination of inputs and byproducts (subject to a 
given level of ethanol production to make it comparable with the GHG minimizing 
combination) as the allocation that solves the following problem: 
( )( ) { } ( ) ( )*
,
, , , , ,  , , ,
b
j j j j j j j j j j
Eth Eth Eth Eth b b Eth
x u
r p r GR V S u Max r u r u p x  s.t. u x GR V S uπ = + − ∈      (12) 
Where jEthr  is the observed price of ethanol obtained by observation j, 
j
Ethu  is the 
observed level of ethanol production by j, bu  is the 2x1 column vector of variable outputs 
(DDGS and MWDGS), jr  represents the 1x2 vector of observed prices of variable 
outputs (byproducts)38 obtained by observation j, x  is the 1x7 vector of variable inputs 
(corn, natural gas, electricity, labor, denaturant, chemicals, and “other processing costs”), 
and jp  represents the 1x7 vector of observed prices of variable inputs paid by j. 
Quantities of labor, denaturant, chemicals and others needed to calculate GR  are 
obtained implicitly dividing total expenditures in these categories by their price indexes 
described in footnote 2. Prices for these categories in equation (12) are also those in 
footnote 2. We will denote the allocation that solves Eq. (12) with ethanol fixed at the 
observed level by { }* *( , )j jx u . The level *jGHG  is calculated by inserting these values 
into (2). 
We define the shadow value of GHG emissions associated with moving from the 
observed allocation to the ROOC maximizing allocation as: 
                                                 
38 Three DMUs in our sample did not sell dried byproducts (they sold 100% MWDGS). Since we did not 
have reported DDGS prices for those three observations to calculate maximum ROOC we used average 
prices of DDGS obtained by other DMUs in the same quarter. 
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*
*
j j
j
GHG j j
SV
GHG GHG
π π−
=
−
             (13) 
An alternative shadow cost to Eq. (13) is that which is incurred by moving from the 
observed to the GHG minimizing combination of inputs and byproducts.  
 
2.4.2. Shadow Cost from Observed to GHG Minimizing Allocation 
The GHG minimizing combination is computed by solving Eq. (7) with ethanol 
production fixed at observed levels and minimum GHG denoted by 
j
GHG . ROOC 
associated with this allocation (calculated by multiplying the GHG minimizing inputs and 
outputs times their respective prices) is designated as jπ .  
We define the shadow value of GHG related to a change from the observed to the 
GHG minimizing point as: 
j j
j
GHG j j
SV
GHG GHG
π π−
=
−
             (14) 
Finally we consider the shadow value of GHG related to a change from the GHG 
minimizing to the ROOC maximizing point.  
 
2.4.3. Shadow Cost from GHG Minimizing to ROOC Maximizing Allocation 
Such a change is illustrated in Fig. 4 in the corn and DDGS space. In Fig. 4 the GHG 
minimizing combination is represented by point B (the isopollution line is denoted by 
j
GHG ). If relative prices are those corresponding to the slope of *
jπ   then ROOC 
maximization is achieved at point A and this requires a decrease in corn and DDGS with 
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respect to the GHG minimizing point. ROOC at A are denoted by *
jπ  and ROOC at B are 
*
j jπ π< . Emissions at B are denoted by jGHG  and emissions at A are *
jjGHG GHG> .  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Shadow Cost from GHG Minimizing to ROOC Maximizing Allocation 
 
The shadow value associated with a change from the GHG minimizing combination 
to the ROOC maximizing one is defined by: 
*
*
j j
j
GHG jj
SV
GHG GHG
π π−
=
−
             (15) 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Environmental Performance of Ethanol Plants 
Fixing ethanol production at observed levels, measures of environmental efficiency 
and their decomposition are calculated for our sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol 
plants and reported in Table 3. Results reveal that DMUs are very efficient from a 
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A 
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technical point of view and that most environmental inefficiency comes from allocative 
sources. Therefore DMUs seem to have room for GHG reductions mainly by changing 
input and output combinations subject to the graph. In particular, the average DMU may 
be able to reduce emissions by 6% which amounts to 3,116 tons of CO2 equivalent 
GHGs per quarter (or 0.46 pounds per gallon of ethanol produced). The average DMU in 
our sample, at observed allocations, displays a GHG intensity of about 46 gCO2e/MJ. At 
the GHG minimizing allocation, the average DMU in our sample displays a GHG 
intensity of 43 gCO2e/MJ which is 6.5% lower than observed levels. This intensity is, for 
example, 55% lower than the target standard established by California by 2019 (86.27 
gCO2e/MJ). It is of interest to know what reallocations of inputs and byproducts may 
actually achieve this improvement and we will go back to this point in detail later. 
 
3.2. ROOC and Environmental Targets 
Shadow costs associated with moving from observed to ROOC maximizing 
allocations are reported in Table 4. Given the rather large variability across observations 
both the median and the average are reported as measures of central tendency. Table 4 
displays some observations that are unusually high and others unusually low. These 
disproportionate deviations from the average are due to changes in inputs that affect 
ROOC but do not affect emissions. These inputs are labor, denaturant, chemicals, and 
other processing costs. We classify as “outlier” any observation whose value exceeds the 
average by more than 3 times the standard deviation. 
An important conclusion we can extract from Table 4 is the fact that almost all DMUs 
reduce GHG emissions by moving from observed to maximum ROOC. This suggests 
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that, under our convexity assumptions, most DMUs (including the average DMU) may be 
able to increase ROOC and reduce GHG simultaneously which would in turn imply that 
these DMUs face no trade off between economic and environmental goals at current 
combinations of inputs and byproducts.  
There are many potential reasons for the failure of DMUs to attain the ROOC-
maximizing allocation. First plants may not face market conditions that allow them to 
reallocate byproducts from dry to wet or viceversa. A rather significant livestock 
production relatively near the plant has to be in place for DMUs to be able to sell a 
significant portion of their byproduct as wet. These market constraints are not captured 
by our analysis. Second the graph is assumed to be convex in our calculations. This may 
not represent technology accurately. There may be indivisibilities in the construction and 
later modifications (expansions or contractions) of plants that result in non-convexities of 
the graph. These non-convexities would prevent plants from choosing the ROOC-
maximizing allocation depicted by the convex graph, rendering economic inefficiencies. 
The fact that DMUs can rearrange inputs and byproducts in such a way that they can 
both increase ROOC and reduce emissions prompts the following questions:  
1. What inputs are reduced or increased and which byproduct is reduced or increased in 
such a rearrangement? 
2. Why are plants not exploiting these reallocations that achieve greater ROOC? 
The answer to the first question for the average plant is provided in Table 5. The 
average DMU would achieve greater ROOC and lower GHG simultaneously mainly by 
reducing the use of corn, natural gas, and electricity per gallon of ethanol produced, 
reducing the production of MWDGS, and increasing production of DDGS. A part of 
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these reductions is achieved through elimination of inefficiencies that would take the 
DMUs to the technological frontier but for the most part they are achieved through 
rearrangements along the surface described by the boundary of the graph defined in Eq. 
(3) 
The answer to the second question is not as straightforward. As noted in the 
discussion of the first question our DMUs may be able to increase ROOC and reduce 
GHG mainly by reducing corn, natural gas, and electricity per gallon of ethanol produced 
and per ton of DDGS produced.39 The apparent engineering (in)ability to maximize 
ethanol and DDGS yields when compared to other DMUs in the sample seems to drive 
the difference between observed production plans and ROOC maximizing plans for many 
DMUs. A note of caution is in place here. These results are based on the assumption that 
all DMUs are constrained by the same technological frontier. Under the assumption of 
homogeneous technology any difference in performance is attributed to efficiency 
differences rather than to technological differences. However technological 
heterogeneities may be present and prevent some DMUs from achieving the performance 
of others in the sample.  
Shadow costs associated with moving from observed to GHG minimizing allocations, 
Eq. (14), for each DMU, average, and median are reported in Table 6.  Nine DMUs lose 
ROOC while reducing GHGs, thus facing positive shadow values of GHGs, meaning a 
cost.  Seventeen DMUs increase ROOC while reallocating to the minimum GHG level. 
The fact that the average willingness to pay for a change in allocation ( j jEπ π− ) is 
positive while average change in GHG is negative, results in negative average shadow 
                                                 
39 Reductions in MWDGS may come as a surprise. However given relative prices it appears as if this was a 
convenient reallocation for many DMUs. 
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values. Table 6 indicates that the average DMU may be able to increase ROOC while 
reducing GHG which again seems to suggest complementarity between goals. In 
particular the average DMU may be able to increase ROOC by about $39 per ton of GHG 
reduced.  The seventeen firms with negative shadow prices would presumably be willing 
to sell permits at any small price, since there is no ROOC lost from reducing their own 
GHGs. 
Since there seems to be a great deal of variability in shadow prices of GHG across 
DMUs we have plotted a histogram that shows the approximate distribution of these 
values in Fig. 5.  
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Figure 5. Histogram of Shadow Values (observed to GHG-minimizing) 
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The histogram does not take into account those observations deemed as outliers. The 
presence of outliers is mainly due, as discussed above, to changes in inputs affecting 
ROOC but not GHG, i.e. labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs. We 
have superimposed to the histogram a normal density function that smoothes out the 
distribution. Despite the variability across DMUs, the highest frequency of shadow 
values (i.e. most of the “mass” of the distribution) appears to be located around zero. This 
means that plants are approximately efficient in the sense that they are operating at levels 
for which the marginal value of GHG is around zero which is, in turn, the current GHG 
price that DMUs face. 
According to Table 7 the average DMU achieves minimization of GHG through 
substantial reductions in DDGS and MWDGS which in turn allows it to significantly 
reduce natural gas and electricity. Finally reductions in corn per gallon of ethanol are also 
involved in this GHG minimization. Such reallocations not only achieve reductions in 
GHG but also increase ROOC (negative shadow value) 
Shadow costs associated with moving from GHG minimizing to ROOC maximizing 
allocations, Eq. (15), for each DMU, average and median are reported in Table 8. All 
DMUs increase both ROOC and GHGs in moving from low GHG solution to high 
ROOC solution. The average DMU would forfeit $1,726 in ROOC for each ton of GHG 
reduced, a very high cost of regulation if that firm were required to reduce GHGs. If 
DMUs are forced to reduce GHG emissions below ROOC maximizing levels, these 
shadow values indicate that they would be willing to purchase permits if the market value 
is in the vicinity of $20 to $30 per ton, rather than reduce one ton of GHG emissions. The 
histogram (with superimposed normal density) corresponding to Table 8 is plotted in Fig. 
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6.  This histogram as the one in Fig. 5 does not take into account those observations 
classified as outliers. 
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Figure 6. Histogram of Shadow Values (GHG Min. to ROOC Maximizing)  
 
The reallocation of inputs and byproducts that would take the average DMU from the 
GHG minimizing to the ROOC maximizing combination is displayed in Table 9. The 
average DMU achieves increases in ROOC mainly through substantial increases in 
DDGS which in turn entails increases in natural gas and electricity, and reductions in 
MWDGS. Another very important component of ROOC increases is reductions of corn 
per gallon of ethanol produced.  
Results for the average DMU in Tables 4, 6, and 8 can be combined to recover the 
shape of the relationship between GHG and ROOC. Plotting the three averages in the 
GHG and ROOC space yields the graph in Fig. 7. We denote the observed combination 
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of the average by ( ),j jGHG π , the ROOC maximizing combination by ( )* *,j jGHG π , and 
the GHG minimizing combination by ( ),j jGHG π . There seems to be room for 
simultaneous improvement of environmental and economic performance, as previously 
indicated in discussions of Tables 4 and 6. However, if the average firm were able to 
adjust inputs and byproducts to the ROOC maximizing combination, it would face an 
intense trade off described just above. 
 
Figure 7. ROOC and GHG 
 
4. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the merits 
and potential of the ethanol industry in the US by investigating the current environmental 
performance at the individual plant level, the potential for improvement in this 
performance and its effects on the industry’s overall emissions of greenhouse gases.  
       • 
( ),j jGHG π   • ( ),
j jGHG π  
( )* *,j jGHG π  
 • 
$1,726 
     -$39 
      - $466 
ROOC  
GHG 
  
 
70 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, our results suggest 
that decision making units (DMUs) may have some room for improving environmental 
performance. However since plants are technically very efficient, most of this 
improvement has to come from changes in combinations of inputs and byproducts along 
the frontier (reduction in environmental allocative inefficiencies). By eliminating 
allocative inefficiencies the average DMU could apparently decrease emissions by 6%, 
which amounts to about 3,116 tons of CO2 equivalent GHG. 
Negative shadow values of GHG from observed to ROOC maximizing combinations 
reveal that at current operating levels DMUs may be able to increase ROOC and reduce 
GHG simultaneously. This result points towards the conclusion that firms are not 
allocating inputs and outputs so as to maximize profits and, therefore, they may increase 
their economic viability helping their case for public support. However, once DMUs have 
maximized profits, our results suggest that they may face significant ROOC losses if they 
are forced to reduce GHG beyond that point. In this case the average DMU in this sample 
would be willing to pay up to $1,726 for a permit to emit ton of GHG, rather than suffer 
the ROOC reduction revealed by the shadow price of reducing carbon from ROOC 
maximizing to GHG minimizing levels. 
The measurement of corn ethanol plants environmental performance, their potential 
for improvement, and ROOC/emissions trade offs conducted in this study should inform 
the debate on whether there is a place for corn ethanol as a “clean” substitute for 
gasoline. In particular our results suggest that ethanol plants in our sample can produce 
energy with considerable lower (52% lower) GHG intensity than gasoline. Moreover 
these plants have some room for reducing this footprint even more by reallocating inputs 
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and byproducts. Such reallocations would achieve a 6.5% reduction in GHG rendering 
energy with a GHG intensity 55% lower than gasoline. In turn these reductions may be 
achieved at a moderate or none economic cost as strongly suggested by a negative 
shadow price of $39 per gallon. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of the seven surveyed plants 
States 
Represented 
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, S. Dakota, Wisconsin 
Smallest 42.5 
Average 53.1 
 
Annual 
Production 
Rate (m. gal/y) Largest 88.1 
03_2006 5 
04_2006 6 
01_2007 7 
02_2007 7 
03_2007 7 
 
Number of 
Survey 
Responses by 
Quarters 
04_2007 2 
Smallest 0 
Average 54 
Percent of 
Byproduct Sold 
as Dry DGS Largest 97 
 Corn Ethanol DDGS MWDGS 
Spot 0 0 3 1 
Customer Contract 5 1 0 1 
 
Primary 
Market 
Technique 
Third Party/Agent 0 5 2 2 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics: Inputs and Outputs 
  
Corn  
(million 
bushels) 
Natural Gas 
(thousand 
MMBTUs) 
Electricity 
(million kwh) 
Ethanol 
(million 
gallons) 
DDGS 
(thousand 
tons) 
MWDGS 
(thousand 
tons) 
Average 4.8 361 7,8 13.7 21.3 14.5 
Std Dev 0.9 61 1.5 2.8 10 15.4 
Min 3.6 297 6.7 10.6 0 199 
Max 8 569 13.3 22,9 34.2 56.2 
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Table 3. Environmental Efficiency Decomposition 
DMU 
Technical 
Environmental 
Efficiency 
Allocative 
Environmental 
Efficiency 
Overall 
Environmental 
Efficiency 
Reduction 
of GHG 
(tons)[a] 
Reduction 
of GHG 
(%)[b] 
1 0.977 1 0.961 3,268 6 
2 1 0.931 0.931 6,227 11 
3 0.985 0.970 0.956 3,617 7 
4 1 0.951 0.951 3,801 7 
5 1 1 0.993 567 1 
6 0.979 1 0.973 2,331 4 
7 1 0.948 0.948 4,697 9 
8 1 0.947 0.947 4,704 8 
9 1 1 1 0 0 
10 1 0.959 0.956 3,539 7 
11 1 0.989 0.989 950 2 
12 1 1 1 0 0 
13 1 0.940 0.940 8,007 9 
14 1 0.949 0.949 4,625 9 
15 1 0.944 0.944 4,804 9 
16 1 0.974 0.974 2,015 4 
17 1 0.985 0.985 1,098 2 
18 1 0.938 0.938 5,178 10 
19 1 0.987 0.987 1,133 2 
20 1 1 1 0 0 
21 1 0.947 0.947 4,611 9 
22 1 0.967 0.967 2,736 5 
23 1 0.974 0.974 2,023 4 
24 1 0.985 0.985 1,199 2 
25 1 0.970 0.970 2,614 5 
26 1 1 1 0 0 
27 1 0.917 0.917 7,941 14 
28 1 0.956 0.956 3,708 7 
29 1 0.961 0.961 3,068 6 
30 1 0.964 0.964 2,831 6 
31 0.993 0.980 0.973 2,239 4 
32 1 0.992 0.992 684 1 
33 1 0.914 0.914 8,662 14 
Average 0.998 0.967 0.965 3,116 6 
[a] This is calculated by taking the difference between observed and minimum GHG emissions. 
[b] Reduction in GHG emissions from previous column as a percentage of observed emissions. 
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Table 4. Shadow Values of GHG: observed to ROOC maximizing combination 
DMU 
WTP for change in 
allocation, *
j jπ π− ($)  
Change in GHG emissions, 
*
j jGHG GHG−  (tons) 
Shadow Value of 
GHG ($/ton) 
1 948,565 -2,618 -362 
2 1,483,022 -5,648 -263 
3 2,094,972 -2,728 -768 
4 1,223,985 -3,105 -394 
5 619,562 120 5,147 - outlier 
6 1,263,224 -1,920 -658 
7 1,515,535 -4,100 -370 
8 2,398,535 -4,405 -545 
9 3,199 0 INFINITE 
10 850,101 -2,636 -322 
11 719,229 -264 -2,726 
12 1,382 0 INFINITE 
13 2,175,472 -7,709 -282 
14 1,597,466 -4,026 -397 
15 1,751,089 -4,339 -404 
16 825,632 -1,027 -804 
17 1,692 0 INFINITE 
18 1,540,254 -4,555 -338 
19 1,230,951 -488 -2,521 
20 258,318 295 877 
21 1,797,859 -3,726 -483 
22 1,975,711 -2,035 -971 
23 781,594 -344 -2,269 
24 1,041,712 -332 -3,141 
25 2,192,398 -1,990 -1,101 
26 9,613 0 INFINITE 
27 2,301,210 -7,495 -307 
28 1,252,438 -3,075 -407 
29 1,439,841 -2,291 -629 
30 1,106,262 -1,801 -614 
31 727,808 -1,367 -532 
32 1,396,934 271 5,154 - outlier 
33 1,865,307 -8,663 -215 
Mean 1,420,685 -3,052 -466 
Median 1,439,841 -2,636 -546 
 
Table 5. Reallocation from observed to ROOC maximizing combination 
Category 
Measure 
Corn Natural Gas Electricity Dry Wet 
Average Change (%) -5.88 -3.83 -0.41 26.03 -10.23 
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Table 6. Shadow Values of GHG: observed to GHG minimizing combination 
DMU 
WTP for change in 
allocation, j jEπ π−  ($) 
Change in GHG emissions, 
j j
EGHG GHG−  (tons) 
Shadow Value of  
GHG ($/ton) 
1 659,193 -3,268 -202 
2 443,897 -6,227 -71 
3 134,209 -3,617 -37 
4 -343,266 -3,801 90 
5 286,956 -567 -506 
6 -526,747 -2,331 226 
7 294,875 -4,697 -63 
8 610,737 -4,704 -130 
9 -18,561 0 INFINITE 
10 -886,553 -3,539 250 
11 260,637 -950 -274 
12 -817,158 0 INFINITE 
13 1,728,919 -8,007 -216 
14 432,472 -4,625 -94 
15 -221,003 -4,804 46 
16 -788,455 -2,015 391 
17 -842,611 -1,098 767 
18 1,041,500 -5,178 -201 
19 326,317 -1,133 -288 
20 -542,483 0 INFINITE 
21 -417,870 -4,611 91 
22 1,343,752 -2,736 -491 
23 -373,408 -2,023 185 
24 -839,949 -1,199 700 
25 1,600,339 -2,614 -612 
26 -263,194 0 INFINITE 
27 307,697 -7,941 -39 
28 176,556 -3,708 -48 
29 164,586 -3,068 -54 
30 -327,399 -2,831 116 
31 -649,530 -2,239 290 
32 -611,531 -684 894 
33 1,046,320 -8,662 -121 
Mean 138,988 -3,548 -39 
Median 176,556 -3,268 -54 
 
Table 7. Reallocation from observed to GHG minimizing combination 
Category 
Measure Corn Natural Gas Electricity Dry Wet 
Average Change (%) -3.05 -6.83 -1.35 -33.63 -4.11 
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Table 8. Shadow Values: GHG minimizing to ROOC maximizing combination 
DMU 
WTP for change in 
allocation, *
j j
Eπ π−  ($) 
Change in GHG emissions, 
*
j j
EGHG GHG−  (tons) 
Shadow Value of 
GHG ($/ton) 
1 289,372 650 445 
2 1,039,125 579 1,794 
3 1,960,763 889 2,206 
4 1,567,251 695 2,254 
5 332,607 688 484 
6 1,789,971 411 4,355 
7 1,220,660 597 2,044 
8 1,787,797 300 5,964 
9 21,760 0 INFINITE 
10 1,736,654 903 1,923 
11 458,592 687 668 
12 818,540 0 INFINITE 
13 446,554 298 1,500 
14 1,164,994 599 1,945 
15 1,972,092 465 4,240 
16 1,614,087 988 1,633 
17 844,302 1,098 769 
18 498,754 622 801 
19 904,634 645 1,403 
20 800,801 321 2,493 
21 2,215,729 886 2,501 
22 631,958 701 901 
23 1,155,002 1,679 688 
24 1,881,661 868 2,168 
25 592,059 623 950 
26 272,807 0 INFINITE 
27 1,993,513 446 4,474 
28 1,075,882 632 1,701 
29 1,275,255 777 1,641 
30 1,433,661 1,030 1,392 
31 1,377,339 872 1,580 
32 2,008,466 955 2,104 
33 818,987 0 INFINITE 
Mean 1,243,777 721 1,726 
Median 1,220,660 687 1,778 
 
Table 9. Reallocation from GHG minimizing to ROOC-maximizing point 
Category 
Measure 
Corn Natural Gas Electricity Dry Wet 
Average Change (%) -2.75 2.82 0.94 12.45 -97.65 
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Appendix A 
The measure in (6) can be mathematically implemented through the following 
nonlinear programming problem: 
(A.1)   
,
1
                 
. . ,  ,  ,  1
z
j j j j
b b Eth Eth
j
Min
s t u M z u zM x Cz z
λ
λ
λ λ− ≤ = ≥ =∑
    
Where jbu  is the vector of dried and wet byproducts, bM  is the 2xJ matrix of observed 
levels of byproducts, z  is the Jx1 vector of intensity variables used to weight 
observations and construct the piecewise linear boundary of the graph, jx  is the column 
vector composed by observed values of all inputs used by observation j, C  is the 7xJ 
matrix of observed values of inputs for all observations, and jEthu  is the observed level of 
ethanol production of the thj  DMU. 
After multiplying the constraints times λ  it is easily seen that this is equivalent to the 
following problem: 
(A.2) 
,
2
       
. . ,  ,  ,   ,  ,  
z
j j j j
b b Eth Eth
j
Min
s t u M z x Cz z u M z z zλ λ λ λ
′Γ
Γ
′′ ′ ′ ′≤ Γ ≥ = = Γ = =∑
  
Following  Färe et al. problem (1) is reformulated into problem (2) because the only 
nonlinear constraint is an equality constraint (i.e. 2λ=Γ ) and is, hence, easier to 
program. In particular, these sub vector hyperbolic measures of technical efficiency are 
calculated through a nonlinear program implemented with the FMINCON procedure in 
MATLAB.  
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Appendix B 
The following program describes the problem: 
(B.1)  
, ,
0.00668274 0.063015823 0.0007445 
                              0.4197522186 0.407868                  
 . . ,   z,  ,    
DDGS MWDGS
c CG elect
x u u
DDGS MWDGS
j
DDGS DDGS MWDGS MWDGS Eth Eth
Min GHG x x x
u u
s t u M z u M u M z x C
= + +
− −
≤ ≤ = ≥ ,    1j
j
z z =∑
 
Where DDGSu  is the vector of dried byproducts, DDGSM  is the 2xJ matrix of observed 
levels of DDGS, z  is JX1 vector of intensity variables, MWDGSu  is the vector of modified 
wet byproducts, MWDGSM  is the 2xJ matrix of observed levels of MWDGS , x  is the 
vector of all inputs, and C  is the 7xJ matrix of observed levels of inputs. This program 
was calculated using the LINPROG routine in MATLAB. 
Based on this quantity, we calculate overall environmental efficiency by solving for 
j
gE  implicitly through Eq. (8) for each observation. 
 
Appendix C 
Proof:  
Let us denote the vector of coefficients of Eq. (1) by ( ),xα β , where xα  is the vector of 
coefficients for corn, natural gas, and electricity, and β  is the vector of coefficients for 
both byproducts. In addition, let us define an arbitrary output and input vector by ( ),p bx u  
where ( ), ,p c CG electx x x x=  and ( ),b MWDGS DDGSu u u=  and denote the thj DMU’s observed 
output and input vector by ( ),j jp bx u . 
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Let ( ) ( )( )1, ,j j j j jp b g g p b gx u GHG E x u E GR−∈ ∩ , then ( ),p bx u GR∈  and since jgE  is a 
minimum: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0.00668274 0.063015823 0.0007445
0.407868 / 0.4197522186 /
j j j j j j
x p b g c g CG g elect
j j j j
MWDGS g DDGS g
x u E x E x E x
u E u E
α β+ = + +
− −
 
Let us denote observations j’s minimum feasible GHG level by 
j
GHG . There are three 
cases to consider:  
1. Assume ( ) jx p bx u GHGα β+ < , then ( ),p bx u GR∉  
2. Asume ( ){ }jx p bx u GHGα β+ > , then 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, : , :jx x x p bv w v w GHG v w v w x uα β α β α β+ ≤ ⊆ + ≤ +  and since the 
hyperplanes defining the two sets are parallel, jgE  can not be a minimum. 
Cases 1 and 2 leave the following case: 
3. ( ) jx p bx u GHGα β+ = . Therefore ( )1 jj j j jg x p g bE x E u GHGα β−+ = . 
 
 
Appendix D  
For  a particular DMU i the program is as follows: 
------------------------------------------ 
Profit Max - fixed observed pn 
------------------------------------------ 
*setting objective function* 
fi = [confidential data]; 
*linear inequality constraints* 
Ai=[confidential data]; 
bi=[confidential data]; 
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*linear equality constraints* 
 
Aeqi=[confidential data]; 
beqi=[confidential data]; 
 
*optimization procedure* 
options=optimset('LargeScale','off','MaxIter',150); 
[xi,fvali] = linprog(fi,Ai,bi,Aeqi,beqi,[],[],[],options); 
fvali 
xi 
 
 
Appendix E 
------------------------------------------------------ 
HISTOGRAM OF SHADOW VALUES 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
A=[-202 
-71 
-37 
90 
-506 
226 
-63 
-130 
250 
-274 
-216 
-94 
46 
391 
767 
-201 
-288 
91 
-491 
185 
700 
-612 
-39 
-48 
-54 
116 
  
82 
290 
894 
-121]; 
 
histfit(A,20) 
 
************************************************************************
* 
B=[445 
1794 
2206 
2254 
484 
4355 
2044 
5964 
1923 
668 
1500 
1945 
4240 
1633 
769 
801 
1403 
2493 
2501 
901 
688 
2168 
950 
4474 
1701 
1641 
1392 
1580 
2104]; 
 
histfit(B,20) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ALLOCATIO OF ALLOWACES I CAP AD TRADE AD PARETO 
EFFICIECY 
 
1. Introduction 
This study evaluates the validity of assuming Coase’s theorem (Coase (1960), Stigler 
(1966)) in designing allocation of allowances in cap and trade systems. It derives a 
general relationship between optimal aggregate pollution and allocation of allowances 
and discusses important ramifications of this link. Of particular interest is the result that 
shows that allocating allowances (or revenues from their selling or auctioning) to low 
income households seems to enhance efficiency. 
There is widespread scientific evidence that natural ecosystems might not adapt to the 
rapid changes in climate caused by global warming. These changes are expected to 
include compromised survivability of plants and animals, altered weather patterns, 
increased sea levels, spread of human diseases (especially tropical diseases) and 
decreased crop yields. Most emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) come from the 
burning of fossil fuels for energy and the clearing of land by individuals and firms. 
Therefore, atmospheric concentration of CO2 can be seen as a privately produced public 
bad. 
Price and quantity controls can be used to internalize the social costs of this public bad. 
The existence of compliance and cost uncertainty leads to different welfare outcomes for 
the two policy instruments. Weitzman (1974) derived theoretical conditions under which 
one policy is preferred to the other. For a variety of reasons, political feasibility not being 
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the least of them, the majority of countries have chosen quantity controls as the 
instrument of choice for dealing with this problem.40 We analyze in this study the optimal 
design of this instrument but we do so under the assumption of certainty. Therefore there 
are no welfare implications to the choice of quantity control over price control.41 
A quantity control implies assigning property rights on pollution to different agents in 
the economy. The assignment of property rights allows for creation of a market through 
which the externality can be traded. If rights are allocated to polluters (situation known as 
“permissive” law) then pollutees (households) pay polluters (firms) to reduce pollution. 
On the other hand if the law is prohibitive (pollutees own the rights) the polluters pay to 
the pollutees for the right to pollute. The distribution of permits across and within groups 
is usually deemed irrelevant on efficiency grounds. Coase’s theorem is invoked to 
support such a conclusion; i.e. regardless of how permits are distributed, agents will 
achieve the efficient pollution level through decentralized trading. However under current 
designs of cap and trade systems the overall level of pollution is determined exogenously 
by law rather than through trading42 and hence it is not clear whether Coase’s theorem 
can be invoked.  
Although a generally accepted definition of Coase’s theorem remains unsettled there 
are two principles that characterize it: efficiency and invariance. The former states that 
creation of property rights will result in an efficient outcome regardless of whom those 
                                                 
40 Setting standards on technology or permissible emissions is another potential instrument that 
governments could use to tackle this problem. 
41 This instrument was not only chosen by countries to tackle national policy but also by groups of 
countries to create international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto protocol. 
42 For example the H.R. 2454:  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 establishes a cap of 17% below 
2005 by 2020 and 80% below 2005 by 2050. 
 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/WaxmanMarkeyExecutiveSummary.pdf 
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rights are assigned to.43 The latter principle states that different allocations of property 
rights will not only result in an efficient outcome but the same efficient outcome (i.e. 
same quantity and prices). 
In the context of cap and trade systems, alternative allocations of allowances are 
discussed in Congress in relation to their impact on income distribution. Some bills (e.g. 
H.R. 2454:  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 also known as Waxman-Markey 
or WM for short) allocate an increased portion of allowances44 to low income 
households45 to enhance equity in income distribution while others do not. Assessment of 
alternative allocations of allowances has been conducted only on normative grounds. 
They are assumed to affect income distribution but not the optimal level of the cap (and 
hence efficiency). The rationale usually put forth for this is the invariance principle 
involved in Coase’s theorem. If the invariance principle does not hold then changes in 
income distribution (presumably through reallocation of allowances) while keeping the 
cap fixed may cause the economy to deviate from the Pareto efficient solution and incur 
welfare losses. This point is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 displays marginal social benefits and costs of pollution. Benefits from 
pollution come from production of final goods that are consumed by households. Social 
costs come from negative effects of climate change. Suppose the cap is fixed at a level 
which corresponds to the Pareto efficient level, P0. An increase in the portion of 
                                                 
43 As long as transaction costs are low enough. 
44 In cap and trade systems allowances can be directly allocated to certain groups of households or they can 
be sold or auctioned by the government and the proceeds transferred to households through lump sum 
transfers. We will use the expressions “allocating allowances” and “transferring revenues from allowance” 
interchangeably. 
45 WM allocates 45% of the value of allowances (approximately $30 billion) to consumers emphasizing 
low income consumers while a recently announced proposal by Senators Kerry and Lieberman maintains 
the same cap as WM (see footnote 43) but it increases transfers of revenue (from permits selling) to low 
income households through consumer rebates. The proposal establishes that a 75% of revenues from 
auctioning of permits will be allocated to consumers in 2026. 
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allowances allocated to low income households is considered by the Congress to enhance 
equity in income distribution maintaining the cap at P0. 
 
Figure 1. Allowance allocation, efficiency, and welfare 
 
Starting from the optimal pollution level if an increase in the portion of allowances 
allocated to low income households changes the optimal level of pollution from P0 to P1 
(e.g. because low income consumers significantly increase their preference for a cleaner 
atmosphere when their incomes are increased) then a welfare loss is incurred. The 
welfare loss amounts to the area ABC. If, on the other hand, an increase in allowances 
allocated to low income households increases the level of optimal pollution from P0 to P2 
then the welfare loss is equivalent to the area DBE. 
As illustrated by Figure 1 there is a link between the optimal level of pollution and 
income distribution. This link may in turn create a relationship between efficiency (i.e. 
existence of welfare losses) and equity. This study will investigate the link between 
allocation of allowances to low income households and optimal pollution underlying 
MSB , MSC 
*P  
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Figure 1. We start by discussing the potential influence of allocation of allowances on 
income and, hence, the social cost of pollution. This is followed by a description of the 
economy under study. We then depict the social optimum level of pollution in this 
economy. Following this we describe how a cap and trade system would work in this 
economy and what the solution of a decentralized economy looks like. The latter will 
allow us to derive values of policy instruments that would achieve the Pareto efficient 
allocation in a market economy. Finally the link between efficiency and income 
distribution is inferred from the relationship between policy instruments. 
 
2. Allocation of Allowances, Income Distribution, and Optimal Cap 
The only case in which distribution of allowances can be discussed without concerns 
about efficiency and welfare is when the invariance principle of Coase’s theorem holds. 
This is possible whenever the effect of changes in allocation of allowances on income 
distribution is zero or when changes in income distribution do not affect optimal 
aggregate pollution. However, we need to consider if these facts are plausible or not.  
The WM bill proposes the creation of 4.6 billion allowances in the first year. According 
to EPA’s preliminary estimates of the implications of WM the price of a permit to emit 
one ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent would range between $13 and $17 (in 2005 
dollars) in the first stage after the bill takes effect. Assuming a price of $15 which is at 
the average of the estimated range, the total value of allowances in the first year would 
amount to about 69 billion dollars. Based on these values Table 1 shows how allocating 
permits to different income categories of consumers in the US may affect their income, 
their demand for energy (we use energy as a proxy for a broader concept of 
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consumption), and hence the associated optimal aggregate level of pollution. For 
simplicity Table 1 assumes constant income and price elasticity of demand. This is no 
necessarily supported by empirical evidence but we use it here for the purpose of 
illustration. 
Table 1. Income Effects and Welfare Losses under Different Permit Distributions 
 
GDP  
(billions  
2008) 
Highest  
Quintile 
(billions  
2008)  
Four 
Lowest  
Quintiles 
(billions 
2008) 
Three 
 Lowest 
Quintiles 
(billions 
2008) 
Two 
Lowest 
Quintiles 
(billions 
2008) 
Lowest 
Quintile 
(billions 
2008) 
Income1 14,200 6,958 7,242 3,976 1,846 511.2 
Income Change (%)2 0.49 1 0.96 1.75 3.76 13.58 
Income Elasticity of  
Demand for Energy3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Energy Price 
 Change (%)4 
7 7 7 7 7 7 
Price Elasticity of  
Demand for Energy5 
-0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
Change in  
Energy Demand (%)6 
-2.31 -1.8 -1.84 -1.05 0.96 10.78 
1 Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf  
2 These values are calculated as the percentage increase in income associated with allocating the value of all 
allowances to each group; ∆incomei /incomei where ∆income is equal to the total value of allowances and 
incomei is the level of income of household group i. 
3 This assumption is consistent with that of most general equilibrium models of the US economy; e.g. 
EPPA, CETA, DICE-99, MERGE, SGM (Webster et al.) 
4 EIA estimation: Waxman- Markey (baseline case) 
5 This assumption is consistent with that of general equilibrium models of the US economy; e.g. EPPA, ER, 
and MERGE (Webster et al.) 
6 This assumption is consistent with that of most general equilibrium models of the US economy; e.g. 
EPPA, CETA, DICE-99, MERGE, SGM (Webster et al.) 
 
Despite the (potential) qualitative and quantitative relevance of allowance allocation in 
aggregate pollution and total welfare no studies exploring the link between optimal level 
of emissions and permits distribution can be found in the literature and this paper 
attempts to fill that gap. The present study investigates the link between income 
distribution and optimal aggregate pollution and analyzes the implications of such a link 
for the simultaneous achievement of economic efficiency (choosing the allowance 
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distribution that rationalizes the exogenous cap) and equity (choosing among allowance 
distributions that reduce the income gap across income categories). In particular 
necessary and sufficient conditions for complementarity, independence and 
substitutability between income distribution and efficiency are derived and expressed in 
terms of technological, preference and ecological parameters.  
 
3. The Economy 
We will investigate now the link between allocation of allowances to low income 
households and optimal pollution underlying Figure 1. The optimal choice of pollution is 
essentially a dynamic problem. In any given period economies choose to emit carbon to 
the atmosphere to produce a consumption good which in turn increases consumers’ 
utility. However, in the following periods, emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and 
the stock of pollutants causes disutility to consumers. Therefore modeling optimal 
pollution requires a dynamic model of the economy. The main goal of this study is to 
explore the (dynamic) relationship between income distribution and optimal pollution and 
its implications in terms of the competing (trade off) or complementary nature of 
efficiency and equity goals. Therefore our model of the economy is one of households 
with different levels of income and pollution generating production.   
 
3.1. Production 
The economy produces a good that can be consumed or saved as capital. Production 
requires the use of energy which in turn results in the emission of greenhouse gases to the 
atmosphere. We follow Copeland and Taylor (1994), (1999), and Stokey (1998) and 
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model pollution as an input to production.46 The technology for production of this good is 
represented by: 
( )( ),t t t t ty f k e p=            (1) 
Where ty  is output at time t , tk  is capital used at t  and tp  is emissions at t  which is a 
function of energy used at t, te . We will denote the function relating energy to pollution 
by ( )t tp e . This function depicts the level of emissions associated with using te  of 
energy. The inverse of this function denotes the level of energy associated with a given 
flow of emissions and we denote it by ( )t te p . The production function depicted by (1) is 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in both arguments. This technology 
allows for substitution between capital and energy but since it considers one aggregate 
index of energy it does not consider substitution between different sources of energy.   
The capital stock tk  evolves according to the following equation of motion: 
( )( )1 , it t t t t t t tk k f k e p x kµ+ − = − −         (2) 
Where  µ  is the depreciation rate. 
Emissions accumulate through time to form a pollution stock tP  (e.g. concentration of 
GHGs in the atmosphere expressed as parts per million): 
 ( )λ−+=+ 11 ttt PpP          (3) 
Where λ  is the natural rate of dissipation and tp  are emissions at t. 
 
 
                                                 
46 This is equivalent to modeling pollution as a byproduct with a technology in which pollution and other 
inputs are separable from the final product.   
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3.2. Consumption 
Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous in terms if their preferences but 
heterogeneous with respect to their income and initial wealth. To simplify the analysis we 
limit consumers’ sources of income to interests on initial holdings of capital and, later, on 
income from sales of emission permits. We ignore labor supply in this model which, 
although counterintuitive, does not diminish the insights of the model. 
There are N households in the economy and no population growth. Consumers’ 
intertemporal preferences are characterized by a discounted utility function of the form: 
( ) ( )∑= ∞
=0
,,
t
titi
tii PxuPxU δ . Since we are assuming homogeneity in preferences we can 
drop the subscript i  on utility and re express it as: 
( ) ( )∑= ∞
=0
,,
t
tit
ti PxuPxU δ         (4) 
Where  δ  is the subjective discount rate, itx  is the consumption level of individual i  at 
time t, and tP  is the accumulated stock of pollution at time t 
The per-period utility function ( )tit Pxu ,  is assumed twice continuously differentiable in 
both arguments.  
In this model emissions are not directly caused by consumption but the stock of 
pollution causes disutility to the consumer. Although household behavior is undoubtedly 
an important source of pollution (e.g. driving cars), empirically, the majority of GHG 
emissions come from the production sector of the economy. So to simplify matters we 
ignore household-generated pollution and just focus on carbon emitted during the 
production of capital and final consumption goods.  
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4. Social Optimum 
We assume that the social planner chooses a level of the externality along with the 
“private” variables to maximize a given social welfare function. As it is conventional in 
this framework, let 





 =∑≥=∆
=
1 and 0,...,
1
1
n
i
iin ηηηη  be the unit simplex of
nℜ . A 
Pareto Optimal Allocation in this economy is a solution to the planner’s problem for a 
given vector of welfare weights ( ) ∆∈= nηηη ,...,1 . The planner’s problem is: 
{ }
( )
, , 0
1 0
max ,
it t t
n
t
i it t
x y P t
i t
u x Pη δ
∞
≥
= =
∑ ∑  
 ..ts  (2) – (3) 
( )( )
1
,
n
it t t t t t
i
x x f k p e
=
= =∑        (5) 
( ) 00 kk =          (6) 
Constraint ( )5  is a “no resource waste” condition. The entire production is consumed 
by households and hence no production is wasted. 
We can now find an instantaneous return function (or value function) for the social 
planner. This function is just the maximized weighted sum of individual returns: 
 
( )
{ }
( )
, 0
1
1
, max ,
. .             
it t
n
t t i it t
x P t
i
n
it t
i
u x P u x P
s t x x
η
≥
=
=
=
=
∑
∑
       (7) 
Considering that ( )( ),t t t t tx f k e p=  and plugging (3) in the second argument of the 
production function respectively yields: 
( )( )( )1, 1t t t t tx f k e P P λ+= − −  
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We now define the indirect utility function in terms of the production function as: 
( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1, , , , 1  , t t t t t t t t tV k k P P u f k e P P Pλ+ + + = − −      (8) 
Using the two equations of motion (2) and (3) it can be easily shown that the set of 
admissible paths form a compact and convex set ℑ  (see Appendix for proof). This means 
that that indirect utility function is a continuous function defined on a compact and 
convex domain which in turn allows us to express the planner’s problem in terms of this 
function ( )11 ,,, ++ tttt PPkkV  as: 
{ }
( )1 1
, 0
0
max , , ,
t t
t
t t t t
k P t
t
V k k P Pδ
∞
+ +
≥
=
∑        (9) 
 ..ts  ( ) ℑ∈++ 11 ,,, tttt PPkk  and ( ) 00 kk =     
The solution of the planner’s problem is characterized by the sequence { }
0
, ≥ttt Pk  that 
constitutes a solution to the following system of Euler equations (subscripts refer to the 
associated partial derivatives): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
4 1 1 3 1 2 1 2
, , ,  , , , 0
, , ,  , , , 0
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
V k k P P V k k P P
V k k P P V k k P P
δ
δ
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ =
+ =
     (10) 
And that satisfy the transversality conditions  
( )1 1 1lim   , , , 0t t t t t
t
k V k k P Pδ + +→∞ =  
( )3 1 1lim   , , , 0t t t t t
t
P V k k P Pδ + +→∞ =  
Denoting the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to i  at period t tiu  
and using the function in equation (8) and plugging in (10) yields: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1
, , , 1 0
, , , 1
,
           , 0
1
t t t
t t t t t t
t t
x t t x t t k t t t
t t
x t t e t t t p t x t t e p t
t
P t t t
P t t
u x P u x P f k p e
u x P f k e p e p u x P f e p
u x P
u x P
δ µ
δ λ
δ
λ
+
+ +
+
+ + + + +
+
+ + +
+
+ +
 − + + − = 
− − +
+ =
−
  (11) 
System (11) denotes the necessary conditions for a socially optimal allocation in terms 
of the two stock variables 1tk +  and 1tP+ . The first equation states that the utility derived 
from an additional unit of current consumption must equal the utility obtained by 
investing that unit and consuming the proceedings of that investment in the next period. 
The second equation is the well known Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson condition for 
efficiency under externalities. This condition states that the marginal social benefits of 
pollution coming from the use of energy for production, must equal its marginal social 
cost resulting from namely effects of GHG concentration on health, biodiversity, weather 
extremes, and natural disasters. 
We are mainly concerned with the socially optimum allocation at the steady state and 
the effect that distribution might have on steady state level of pollution. At steady state 
*
1t tx x x+= = , 
*
1t tk k k+= =  and 
*
1t tP P P+= = . From the equations of motion at steady 
state we know that ( )( )* * * * *,ix f k e p kµ= −   i=1,2 and * *p Pλ= . Necessary conditions 
for a social optimum at steady state can be expressed as:  
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
* * *
* * *
* * *
* * * * * *
* *
* * * * * * * *
, 1 1
, ,
,
, , 1 , 0
1
k
x e p
P
Px e p
f k e p
u x P f k e p e p
u x P
u x P f k e p e p u x P
δ µ
δ λ δ
λ
 + − =
 
 − − + + =
  −
 (12) 
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We can now link the optimal aggregate level with the individual levels of consumption 
through the expressions for ( )* *,xu x P  and ( )* *,Pu x P . The indirect utility function at 
steady state is:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
* * * * * * * * *
1 1 1
, , , ,
C C C
i i i i C i
i i i
u x P u x P u x P u x x Pη η η
− −
= = =
 
= = + − 
 
∑ ∑ ∑  
Where 
1
* * *
1
,
C
C i
i
u x x Pη
−
=
 
− 
 
∑  represents the weighted utility of the Nth household. 
The derivatives are: 
( ) ( )
1
* * * * * * *
1
, : , , 0   
i i C
C
x i x i C x i
i
u x P u x P u x x P i Cη η
−
=
 
− − = ∀ ≠ 
 
∑    (13.a) 
( )
1
* * * * *
1
, ,
C
x C x i
i
u x P u x x Pη
−
=
 
= − 
 
∑        (13.b) 
Combining (13.a) and (13.b) yields: 
( ) ( )* * * *, ,        
ix i x i
u x P u x P iη= ∀        (13.c) 
These expressions indicate that, at the optimum, the social planner equalizes weighted 
marginal utilities of all consumers. 
In addition the derivative of ( )* *,u x P  with respect to the overall level of pollution is: 
( ) ( )* * * *
1
, ,
C
i
P i P i
i
u x P u x Pη
=
=∑         (13.d) 
The relationship in (13c) reveals that the system (12) really involves N+1 equations: 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )* *
* * *
* 1 *
* * * *
* 1 *
1
1 1
, 1 0
1 1
, 1 11
 = 0    1,...,
1 ,,
i
k
i x i
C
i
e pi P i
i
f k e p
u x p
i C
f k e p e pu x p
δ µ
µ
δ
δ λ
η λ δ λ
λη λ
−
−
=
− − + − − =
 
 + −
  − − − − ∀ =
−  
 ∑
  (14) 
This system is defined in terms of *p , *k , and *ix , i=1,…,N. There are however only N 
independent variables as the Nth *ix  is determined by the no-waste condition 
( )( )* * * *
1
,
C
i
i
f k e p x
=
=∑ . 
 
5. Market Economy 
Levels of production, capital, energy and pollution result from the behavior of 
consumers and firms which are in turn driven by prices in markets. We turn our attention 
now to modeling this behavior of consumers and producers. 
 
5.1. Producers Problem under Cap and Trade  
Now we concern ourselves with allocative efficiency in the production sector of the 
economy. In particular we express the firms’ profit maximization problem in terms of the 
production possibilities frontier as: 
( )( ) ( )0 0 0 ,t t t p e tMax f k e p rk p p p e pΠ = − − −   
Where: ( )( )0,t tf k e p  is the level of production at t 
r  is the rental rate of capital 
pp  is the price of a permit 
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ep  is the price of energy 
0p  is the cap on emissions established by the government 
Note that profits Π  are written in the same way regardless of whether the firm is 
endowed with the permits or whether it has to buy them in the market. In both cases the 
term ( 0pp p− ) is included in Π  but its interpretation differs. If firms have to buy permits 
in the market this term captures actual payments in pollution permits. If permits are 
allocated to the firms this term captures the opportunity cost of using the permits in 
production rather than selling them in the market at price pp . So the manner in which 
permits are allocated to firms makes no difference in terms of their decisions and market 
outcome.  
There are no private intertemporal trade-offs faced by firms and hence we can drop the 
time subscripts. From the first order conditions of this problem (levels of variables 
resulting from private optimization will be denoted by the superscript M ) we derive the 
following relationships: 
( )( )0,k t tf k e p r=          (15) 
( )( )0 0 0, t te t t p ede def k e p p pdp dp= +        (16) 
The combination of equations (19) and (20) determines the derived demands for capital 
and pollution/energy as functions of prices. 
 
5.2. Consumers Problem under Cap and Trade 
In our model consumers maximize the present value of their future utility stream subject 
to their budget constraint. In a market economy consumers use their income for 
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consumption or savings. The level of income of each household i  at time t is given by an 
exogenous source denoted by itI  and transfers from the government itε  funded by 
reveneues from permits selling. Consumers save by accumulating assets and the 
accumulated level of this asset at time t is denoted by itA . Meanwhile the level of 
consumption is denoted by itx . Therefore the consumer’s problem is as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )
,
0
1
 , ,
. .  1
it it
i t
it t
x p
t
it t it it it it
Max U x P u x P
s t A r A I x
δ
ε
∞
=
+
=
= + + + −
∑
       (17) 
Where tr  is the market interest rate, itA  denotes assets held by household i at time t, itI  
is income of household i at t, itε  is additional income transferred from the government to 
household i at time t (funded by the proceeds from the selling or auctioning of permits to 
producers),47 and itx  is consumption of household i at t.  
Solving problem (17) yields the following first order conditions: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
, 1 ,
it it
M M
x it t t x it tu x P r u x Pδ + + += +  
( )1 1it t it t it itA r A I xε+ = + + + −  
Solving for optimal consumption and savings ( itx  and 1itA + ) requires combining both 
FOCs and solving the resulting difference equation. In steady state the solution can be 
generically denoted by: 
( ), ,i i i ix c r I ε=          (18) 
Therefore steady state consumption is a function of the interest rate, the household’s 
level of income, and income transfers from the government to the household. The 
                                                 
47 Instead of directly allocating permits to households we assume that the government sells or auctions the 
permits to producers (covered sectors). The proceeds from this are then distributed across households 
through lump sum transfers. This is consistent with most mechanisms discussed in climate bills.  
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function ( ), ,i i ic r I ε  can be linear or non-linear in income and transfers and if it is non-
linear it can be concave or convex depending upon preferences. 
 
5.3. Market Equilibrium Conditions 
Behavior of firms and consumers are functions of prices. Prices on the other hand are 
determined endogenously in a market economy based on market equilibrium conditions 
and the identity that establishes that revenue from permits selling or auctioning is rebated 
through lump sum transfers to consumers (budget equilibrium condition):  
( ) ( )0
1
, , , , ,
C
p e i i i
i
k r p p p k r I ε
=
=∑        (19.a.) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )0 0
1
, , , , , ,
C
p e i i i
i
f k r p p p e p c r I ε
=
=∑       (19.b.) 
0
1
C
p i
i
p p ε
=
=∑           (19.c.) 
Based on these equations we will find expressions for equilibrium prices as functions of 
exogenous variables namely income levels { }
1
C
i i
I I
=
= , and also as functions of policy 
instruments { }
1
C
i i
ε ε
=
=  and 0p : 
( )0 , ,r p Iε           (20) 
( )0 , ,ep p Iε           (21) 
( )0 , ,pp p Iε           (22) 
These functions capture in some sense the private reaction to public policy and their 
impact on market equilibrium. Therefore equilibrium prices can be used to discuss the 
implementation of the social optimum in (17) through a cap and trade system. 
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6. Income Distribution and Optimal Pollution 
6.1. Implementation of Social Optimum in a Market Economy 
Necessary conditions for a social optimum were depicted in (14). For simplicity we will 
assume two groups of households, groups 1 and 2. Under this assumption (and dropping 
the * superscript) system (14) becomes: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 2
0
* 1 0
1 1
0
* 1 0
1
* 1 0 * 1 0
1 1 2 2
1 1
,
, 1 1 1 1
=0 
1 1 1 ,,
, ,
K
x
C
i
E p
i P i
i
x x
f K E p
u x p
f K E p Eu x p
u x p u x p
δ µ
δ
η λ δ λ
δ λ λη λ
η λ η λ
−
−
=
− −
− −
  = 
 + −
− −   − − −     
=
∑
 
Which after plugging the first and third equations into the second yields: 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* 1 0
2 2 2
0 0
* 1 0
1
, 1 1 1
=0 
1 , ,,
x
C
i
K E p
i P i
i
u x p
f K E p f K E p Eu x p
η λ δ λ
δ λη λ
−
−
=
 + −
− −   −         ∑
  (23) 
In this context the social planner determines aggregate capital and pollution, and 
individual households’ consumption. In reality, however, the government creates a 
market for emissions and only controls the overall level of pollution and lump sum 
transfers to individual households. So in a decentralized economy the government, 
anticipating the reaction of private agents through markets, aims at implementing 
conditions described in (23) through manipulation of the aforementioned policy 
instruments. This can in fact be thought as a dynamic game between the government and 
private agents in which the government moves first and hence the game is solved through 
backward induction. 
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The solution to the government’s problem of maximizing social welfare in a 
decentralized market economy consists of expressions that depict levels of policy 
instruments as functions of exogenous variables namely initial wealth distribution. To 
find such a solution we need to incorporate firm’s behavior (15) and (16), consumers’ 
behavior (18), and equilibrium prices (20)-(22): 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
 of pollution
2
0 1 0
1
0
 of pollution
0 0 0 1 0
2 2 2 2 20
1 1
, , , , ,
1
  =
, ,
 , , , , , , , , ,
MSC
i
i P i i i
i
MSB
t
p e x
u c I r p I p
r p I
de
p p I p p I u c I r p I p
dp
δ λ
η ε ε λ
δ λ
ε
ε ε η ε ε λ
−
=
−
 + −
  − −
 
+ 
 
∑
upcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmidupcurlybracketright
upcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmidupcurlybracketright
 
  (24) 
As discussed in the introduction to this study the link between equity and efficiency in 
the context of a cap and trade system critically depends upon the relationship between 
income distribution and optimal pollution. If there is no link between income distribution 
and optimal pollution Coase’s theorem will hold. In this case the allocation of allowances 
can be used as an instrument for income redistribution while keeping the cap fixed 
without violating Pareto efficiency. If a link between income distribution and optimal 
pollution exists, on the other hand, Coase’s theorem does not hold and any change in 
allowance allocation while keeping the cap fixed would entail a violation of Pareto 
efficiency and hence a welfare loss. 
The link between income distribution and the optimal level of aggregate steady state 
pollution can be derived from equation (24). System (24) implicitly defines levels of the 
cap ( 0p ) and distribution of revenue from permit selling ( )1 2,ε ε  that would achieve a 
Pareto efficient allocation in a market economy. After imposing the government’s budget 
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equilibrium condition ( ( )0 02 1, ,pp p p Iε ε ε= − ) we denote the implicit function in (24) 
by ( )0 1, 0G p ε = . This expression shows that, given wealth distribution and private 
behavior, changes in 0p  would require changes in 1ε  to maintain Pareto efficiency and 
maximize social welfare. An important corollary of (24) is that there is no unique 
efficient level of pollution. A rather wide range of levels of pollution can be rationalized 
by fine tuning the distribution of revenue through lump sum transfers 1ε .  
 
6.2. Distribution of Allowances and Optimal Pollution 
Transfers of revenue from permit selling can be conducted without any regard for 
efficiency as long as no link exists between these transfers and the optimal level of 
aggregate pollution. This will hold true whenever the invariance principle of Coase’s 
theorem obtains, i.e. 1
0
0
d
dp
ε
= . On the other hand if this does not hold, revenue transfers 
will affect the optimal level of pollution creating a wedge between this level and the 
exogenous cap and resulting in deadweight losses.  
If the invariance principle does not hold there could be a positive or a negative 
relationship between pollution abatement (reduction in 0p ) and income distribution. 
There will be a complementarity (trade off) between abatement and equity whenever 
higher (lower) transfers to low income households are needed to rationalize a lower level 
of pollution. If household type 1 earns a low level of income and 1
0
0
d
dp
ε
<  then both 
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income redistribution and pollution abatement can be achieved simultaneously. We can 
say then that there is a complementarity between goals. There is a trade off if 1
0
0
d
dp
ε
> . 
We denote the income elasticity of demand corresponding to households 1 and 2 as 1ω  
and 2ω  respectively. We derive the expression for 
1
0
d
dp
ε
 by applying the implicit function 
theorem to ( )0 1,G p ε  in equation (24):  
( )
( )
0
1
0
11
0 0
1
,
,
p
G pd
dp G pε
εε
ε
= −
2 1 2
0 0
2 1 2
1 1 1
dc dc dcdr dr
dr dr dp dr dp
dc dc dc
d d d
α β τ γ φ χ
γ κ α ψ
ε ε ε
    − − − + + +        =
           
− + + −        
           
  (25) 
Where: 
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
dc c dc dr
d dr d
ω
ε ε ε
= + , 2 2 2 22
1 2 1 1
1
p
p
dpdc c d dc dr
d dp d dr d
ε
ω
ε ε ε ε
 
= − +  
 
, 
2 2
2
2
2
c pc
p
u u
u
η
α = , 2 12 1
2
c pc
p
u u
u
η η
β = , 2 22 c c
p
u
u
η
γ = , 12 c p
p
u
u
η
φ = , 22 c pp
p p
u u
u u
η
τ =  
( )
( )
2
0 0 0
2
22
p E
p p E pp E p
c
p p p E
dp dpdr
p e p r e p e
u dp dp dp
u r p e p
η
χ
  
+ + + +  
  =
 + 
 
, 
2 12 1c pc
p p
u u
u u
η η
κ = , 
( )
( )
2
0
2 1 1
22
p E
p p E p
c
p
p p E
dp dpdr
p e p r e
u d d dp
u r p e p
η ε ε
ψ
  
+ + +  
  =
 + 
  
 
Under usual regularity assumptions (concavity of utility and negative cross derivatives 
1pc
u  and 
2pc
u ) 0α < ,  0β < ,  0γ > , 0φ > , 0κ < , and 0τ < . 
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Our next step is to disentangle the conditions under which Coase’s theorem can be 
invoked and indentify, when Coase’s theorem does not hold, whether environmental and 
distributional goals are substitutes or complements.  
 
6.2.1. Independence of Goals and Fulfillment of Coase’s Theorem 
We find in this section conditions for independence between pollution abatement and 
income distribution which in turn imply fulfillment of Coase’s theorem.  
PROPOSITION 1. There is independence between permit distribution and optimal 
pollution whenever: 
1. Substitution effects in demand for consumption good and market effects48 of changes 
in the cap are such that the change in marginal social benefit are exactly the same as the 
change in marginal social cost; i.e. 2 1 2
0 0
dc dc dcdr dr
dr dr dp dr dp
α β τ γ φ χ
    − − − = − + +        
. 
2. Preferences, pollution-energy relationship, and market effects are such that changes in 
the cap cause no effect on marginal social benefit and marginal social cost. In particular 
no effect of changes in the cap on interest rates (i.e. 
0
0
dr
dp
= ) and preferences that are 
linear in pollution (i.e. 0τ = ) imply no effect of a cap change on marginal social benefit 
2 1
0
dc dc dr
dr dr dp
α β τ
  − − −    
. Additionally preferences that are additively separable in 
consumption and pollution (i.e. 
1
0c pu =  which results in 0γ φ= = ), and no market 
effects of changes in the cap and a linear relationship between energy and pollution (i.e. 
                                                 
48 We refer to effects of changes in the cap on equilibrium market prices as “market effects.” 
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1 1 1
0
p E
pp
dp dpdr
e
d d dε ε ε
= = = =  which jointly result in 0χ = ) imply no effect of a cap change 
on marginal social cost 2
0
dc dr
dr dp
γ φ χ
 
− + + 
 
. 
3. Income elasticity of consumption of group 1 or market effects are so high that the 
effect of a change in the cap on marginal social cost is infinite. In addition no link 
between the cap and allocation exists if income elasticity of consumption of group 2 is so 
high that the effect of a change in the cap will make marginal social benefit (cost) infinite 
(i.e. ( )γ α> < ). 
See proof in Appendix. 
Condition 1 depicts a situation in which benefits of reducing pollution (reduction of 
disutility from pollution for households 1 and 2) are exactly outweighed by welfare loss 
of consumption reduction, resulting from changes in prices and income.  
Condition 2 is self explanatory. If changes in the level of pollution cause no change in 
prices and, in addition, changes in income have no effect on consumption, the way 
revenues are distributed is irrelevant. Whether permits are allocated to group 1 or 2 will 
not matter for aggregate market equilibrium and consumers’ welfare. 
 Finally if consumption tends to be perfectly elastic with respect to income for all 
households then revenue distribution is irrelevant. This is due to the fact that transfers of 
permits to either group will have the same effect on consumption and welfare. 
Are these conditions plausible? Condition 1 is implausible since it requires specific 
values of price elasticity of consumption for both groups of households and of income 
elasticity of consumption of type 2 households. Condition 2 requires perfectly inelastic 
demands with respect to both prices and income and no effect on market prices of 
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changes in the cap. This is also very unlikely. Finally condition 3 requires consumption 
functions that are infinitely elastic with respect to income. This is hardly the case if we 
look at empirical estimates of Engel curves in the United States.49 
To sum up conditions required for orthogonality between permit distribution and 
optimal pollution are unlikely to hold. This in turn implies that the invariance principle 
embedded in Coase’s theorem is inappropriately invoked when discussing allocation of 
allowances in cap and trade design and also when conducting comparisons between cap 
and trade and carbon taxes. 
 
6.2.2. Trade off or Complementarity between Goals 
There will be a complementarity (trade off) between pollution abatement and equity 
whenever ( )10 0
d
dp
ε
< >  and household group 1 earns a low level of income. In order to 
identify whether group 1 is a high or low income group we will link income level to 
income elasticity of demand ( 1ω ). Finally we find the link between pollution and income 
level through the link between pollution and the income elasticity of demand. 
PROPOSITION 2. If income elasticity of consumption is negatively correlated with the 
level of income (concave Engel curve)50 then complementarity between goals is more 
likely the smaller the drop in consumption caused by pollution abatement51 (through 
lower price elasticity of consumption), the cleaner the energy (due to more efficient 
                                                 
49 See survey by Gahvari and Tsang (2008). 
50 Empirical evidence pointing towards concavity has been found in Gahvari and Tsang (2008) 
51 There are two stages in the link between pollution abatement and consumption. First reductions in total 
pollution increase the price of consumption goods. Second the increase in price reduces consumption; this 
effect depends upon the price elasticity of consumption. 
  
107 
technologies or less carbon intensive sources), and the bigger the effect of pollution 
abatement on allowance and energy prices. 
See proof in Appendix. 
Let us recall that 1 1
0 0
dc dc dr
dp dr dp
=  and 02 2 2
0 0 0
2
p
p
dpdc dc dcdr
p p
dp dr dp d dpε
 
= + + 
 
. Therefore 
pollution abatement affects consumption of household group 1 through its effect on 
consumption good’s price (substitution effect). On the other hand it affects consumption 
of group 2 through both prices and changes in income from revenue transfers 
0
0
p
p
dp
p p
dp
 
+ 
 
. Therefore the mechanism underlying the link between pollution and 
transfers to low income households unfolds as follows. Under high market effects 
(increases in prices) of reductions in the cap a positive effect of abatement on income of 
household group 2 becomes likely (through 0
0
p
p
dp
p p
dp
 
+ 
 
). The increases in prices, 
however, do not affect consumption patterns of low income households given the 
inelastic nature of their demand. Moreover it does not cause a significant reduction in the 
use of energy by firms because energy is clean (high pe ) and, hence, production is not 
significantly affected. Therefore consumption must not drop too much while household 
group 2 was favored by the positive income effects on increases in permits prices. 
Increases in welfare are, then, achieved by a redistribution of revenue from allowances to 
low income households. This is because these households display higher income 
elasticity of consumption making the transfer more effective in maintaining social 
welfare. This explains the positive link between complementarity between goals. 
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7. Pareto Efficiency and Income Distribution 
We have derived in section 6 a link between pollution and income distribution and, as a 
result, we have drawn conclusions in terms of conditions for a complementarity (and 
trade off) between environmental and equity goals. However no direct link between 
Pareto efficiency and equity in income distribution has been depicted. We now tackle this 
important issue. 
Deciding on the level of the cap ( 0p ) neglecting issues of allowance allocation in cap 
and trade systems (i.e. assuming orthogonality between the distribution of revenues and 
optimal pollution) may result in deviations from the socially optimal pair ( 0p , 1ε ) 
depicted by (24). This in turn causes deadweight losses to society that could be prevented 
if the government followed equation (24). Deadweight losses can be calculated as the 
difference between maximum social welfare and social welfare obtained when 
government operates under the assumption of orthogonality (as it has arguably done in 
previous policy designs). The former is obtained by incorporating firm’s behavior (15) 
and (16), consumers’ behavior (18), government’s budget equilibrium condition 
( ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 02 1pp p p p pε ε= − ), and equilibrium prices (20)-(22) into the social welfare 
function ( ( ) ( )1 1 0 2 1 01 1 2 2, ,V u x p u x pη λ η λ− −= + ): 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 01 1 1 1 2 2 2 1, , , , , ,pV u x r I p p u x r I p p p p pη ε λ η ε λ− −= + −  (26) 
Social welfare under orthogonality is: 
( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 0 2 0 0 1 01 1 1 1 2 2 2 1, , , , , ,orth pV u x r I p u x r I p p p pη ε λ η ε λ− −= + −   (27) 
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The difference between *V  and orthV  is that Pareto optimum allocation of allowances 
implicitly depicted by (24), i.e. ( )01 pε , are incorporated into the former but not the 
latter. Deadweight losses are denoted by the difference between both; * orthDWL V V= − . 
The welfare impact of pollution abatement (reductions in the cap) while keeping transfers 
to group 1 constant can be denoted by (see Appendix): 
( )
1
2
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
2 2 1 2 2 1
2
1 2 1
                      1
c
p
c
p
d DWL dc d dc ddr
u
dp dr d dp d dp
dpdc d dc d ddr
u
dr d dp d dp d dp
ε ε
η
ε ε
ε ε ε
η
ε ε ε
  
= +     
   
+ + −          
 
Total deadweight losses are determined by the area below 
( )d DWL
dp
 between observed 
cap 0p  and optimal cap *p . Therefore: 
0
1 2 1 2
*
1 2 1 21 2 1 2 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1
 
p
c c c c
p
dc dc dc dc d ddr
DWL u u u u dp
dr dr d d d d dp
ε ε
η η η η
ε ε ε ε
    = + + +       
∫  
From the necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency we know that 
1 2
1 2
1 2c cu u bη η= = . 
Therefore: 
0
*
1 2 1 2 2 1
1 1 2 1
1  
p
p
pp
dpdc dc dc dc d ddr
DWL b dp
dr dr d d d dp d dp
ε ε
ε ε ε ε
    = + + + −         
∫    (28) 
There is a deadweight loss of assuming orthogonality (i.e. invariance principle of 
Coase’s theorem) whenever DWL = *W - orthogonalW >0. First note from (28) that violation 
of the invariance principle from Coase’s theorem is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a link between efficiency and transfers to low income households. This 
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violation is, as proved in Proposition 1, the most likely situation. We present now an 
important result linking efficiency and income distribution. 
PROPOSITION 3. Efficiency requires greater transfers to low income households (and 
hence more equitable income distribution) the higher the effect of these transfers on the 
price of permits. 
See proof in Appendix. 
The mechanism underlying the result in Proposition 3 is as follows. Transferring 
revenues to household group 1 has a positive effect on marginal social benefit coming 
from increases in consumption of this group. The welfare gain is positively linked with 
income elasticity of demand from group 1 which means that (under concave Engel 
curves) greater transfers to one group are desirable the lower the group’s income.  
On the other hand increasing transfers to group 1 implies reducing transfers to group 2 
and their consumption. The welfare loss associated with this will be positively linked to 
their income elasticity of consumption. Moreover increasing transfers to group 1 may 
affect the equilibrium price of permits which, in turn, will affect total government 
revenues and transfers to group 2 (through the government’s budget equilibrium equation 
( )0 02 1 1, ,pp p p Iε ε ε= − ). This second effect depends upon the impact of transfers to 
group 1 on the price of permits. If the impact is negative (increases in transfers to group 1 
reduces the price of permits) then group 2 will face a drop in the value of the permits it 
receives every period and a reduction in consumption. This can only be compensated 
with transfers to group 2 at the expense of group 1 (low income households). 
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8. Existence of Efficient Solution 
We have derived the link between permit distribution and optimal cap and this link is 
depicted by equation (24). As mentioned before a wide range of levels of pollution can be 
rationalized by manipulating the distribution of revenue through lump sum transfers ( 1ε ). 
But can any level of pollution be rationalized through 1ε ? If the answer to this question is 
affirmative then it does not matter how low a pollution level might be, there is an 
efficient way of implementing it through markets. If the answer is no then this means that 
implementing reductions of pollution beyond a certain level through markets will entail 
deadweight losses and these have to be accounted for when evaluating the policy.  
We say that a cap 0p  can be rationalized whenever there exists a lump sum transfer to 
poor households ( 1ε ) that is both positive and feasible (the lump sum transfer does not 
exceed total revenue from selling of permits) and such that Pareto optimality (i.e. 
equation (24)) holds for the pair ( )0 1,p ε . In technical terms any level of pollution can be 
rationalized whenever:  
( )* 0 *1 1 1: , 0G pε ε ε∃ = =  and ( )* 0 0 *1 10 , ,pp p pε ε θ< < , 0 0p∀ > . 
The discussion above is illustrated graphically below. We plot in Figure 2 the implicit 
function ( )0 *1, 0G p ε =  depicting Pareto efficient combinations.  
Any pollution level can be implemented efficiently as long as the intercept of the 
function (i.e. ( )1 0ε ) is positive and finite. Functions 1G  and 2G  are examples of 
economies in which any pollution level (including zero) can be implemented without any 
deadweight losses. Functions 1G ′  and 2G ′  exemplify economies in which there are no 
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positive and finite levels of 1ε  that can be implement very low levels of pollution 
(including zero) without deadweight losses. 
 
 
Figure 2. Efficient Permit Distributions 
 
Of course existence of a positive finite intercept will depend upon topological 
properties of ( )0 *1,G p ε  which in turn depend upon properties of preferences and 
technology. Note, in addition, that estimation of ( )0 *1,G p ε  requires knowledge of 
demand corresponding to each income group and technology. Empirical information used 
by computable general equilibrium models of the US economy may shed some light into 
this implicit function and its asymptotic behavior. This can in turn be useful in 
understanding and quantifying the welfare losses involved in implementing the cap 
through markets. 
1ε  
0p  
1G ′  
1G  
2G  
2G ′  
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9. Conclusions 
The present study analyses the validity of assuming independence between allocation of 
allowances (or transfer of revenue from permit selling) and Pareto efficiency in the 
context of cap and trade systems and its implications in terms of convenient ways to 
allocate allowances or revenue from the selling of those allowances. We find in this study 
that the link permit distribution and Pareto efficiency depends upon the relationship 
between allowance allocation to low income households and optimal aggregate level of 
pollution. If there is no link between these two (i.e. the invariance principle of Coase’s 
theorem holds) then there is no relationship between transfers to low income households 
and efficiency. However, this study finds (Proposition 1) that invariance holds under very 
implausible configurations of preferences and technology. Therefore Coase’s theorem 
may have been inappropriately invoked in discussions on how to allocate allowances 
given the exogenously established cap which may in turn result in welfare losses. 
Regarding the link between allowance allocation and optimal pollution (i.e. the 
invariance principle does not hold) this study finds (Proposition 2) that pollution 
abatement would require higher transfers to low income households the smaller the drop 
in consumption caused by pollution abatement (through lower price elasticity of 
consumption), the cleaner the energy (due to more efficient technologies or less carbon 
intensive sources), and the bigger the effect of pollution abatement on equilibrium prices 
of allowances and energy (Proposition 2). 
If a relationship between allowance allocation and optimal pollution exists then changes 
in the allocation while keeping the cap constant yield welfare losses (Pareto inefficiency). 
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This study has derived a theoretical relationship between transfers to low income 
households (LIHH) and Pareto efficiency. In particular we find (Proposition 3) that 
efficiency requires greater transfers to low income households (and hence more equitable 
income distribution) the higher the effect of these transfers on the price of permits. The 
effect of transfers on the price of permits is important because it affects the value of 
permits held by high income households (HIHH). If transfers to LIHH increase the price 
of permits then the value of allowances received by HIHH every period is increased 
which increases their income and consumption. This helps alleviate welfare losses of 
HIHH caused by income redistribution. Therefore, in this case, achievement of Pareto 
efficiency through cap and trade may require a more equitable income distribution 
(efficiency and equity are compatible goals).  
Finally this study finds (as depicted by implicit function ( )0 *1,G p ε  in equation (24) 
and illustrated in Figure 2) that a wide range of caps can be rationalized (or efficiently 
implemented) through a market economy by manipulating the allocation of allowances. 
This is a relevant result due to the fact that caps will probably be determined not based on 
an economic criterion but rather a scientific one (presumably incorporating irreversibility 
issues). In this context it is our task as economists to find the allowance allocation that 
maximizes welfare while implementing this cap. Pareto efficiency however is not 
guaranteed for any level of the cap. In fact there may not be an allowance allocation that 
rationalizes a given cap and, in such a case, the implementation of the cap entails welfare 
losses. But even if no Pareto efficient allocation exists, an understanding and 
quantification of the welfare losses involved in implementing the cap through markets is 
of great interest. 
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Appendix 
Proof of compactness and convexity of ℑ . 
Using equations of motion (2) and (3) we may define the set of admissible paths as: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
1 1
2 1
1 1
, : 1 , 1
, : 1 , 1
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
k k k k f k e p k
P P P P f k e P P
µ µ
λ λ λ
+ + +
−
+ + +
 ∈ − ≤ ≤ + − 
ℑ =  
∈ − ≤ ≤ + −  
ℝ
ℝ
 
Output ( )( )1,t t t tf k e Pλ −  is positive and then ( )( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1t t t t t tf k e p k kµ µ+ − > − . 
Therefore compactness of both sets implies convexity. Since 1tk +  and 1tP+  belong to +ℝ  
then both sets are compact.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
 The invariance principle holds if and only if: 
 
2 1 2
0 0
2 1 2
1 1 1
0
dc dc dcdr dr
dr dr dp dr dp
dc dc dc
d d d
α β τ γ φ χ
γ κ α ψ
ε ε ε
    − − − + + +         =
           
− + + −        
           
. This condition holds if and only 
if the numerator is zero or the denominator is infinite. The former is true whenever 
2 1 2
0 0
dc dc dcdr dr
dr dr dp dr dp
α β τ γ φ χ
    − − − = − + +        
, or 
0
0
dr
dp
τ φ χ= = = = . In turn 
from the expressions for 
0
,  ,  ,
dr
dp
τ φ  and χ  we know that these are zero if and only if 
preferences are linear in pollution (i.e. 
1
0c pu =  which results in 0τ = ), preferences are 
additively separable in consumption and pollution (i.e. 
1
0c pu =  which results in 
0γ φ= = ), no market effects are caused by changes in the cap (i.e. 
1 1 1
0
p E
dp dpdr
d d dε ε ε
= = = ), and a linear relationship between energy and pollution exists (i.e. 
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0ppe =  which jointly result in 0χ = ). The denominator will be infinite whenever 1ω →  
−∞ , 2ω → −∞ , or market effects are infinite (i.e. 
1 1 1
p E
dp dpdr
d d dε ε ε
= = = ∞ ) ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
If income elasticity of consumption is negatively correlated with the level of income 
(concave Engel curve) and household group 1 earns a very low level of income then 
income elasticity of consumption of household group 1 will be very high. This will likely 
make the denominator negative; ( )
1
0
1,G pε ε <0. Then 
0
1
dp
dε
<0 if and only if 
( )0 0 1,pG p ε >0. In turn ( )0 0 1,pG p ε >0 if and only if 
2 1 2
0 0
0
dc dc dcdr dr
dr dr dp dr dp
α β τ γ φ χ
    − − − + + + >        
. Given that 0α < ,  0β < , 0γ > , 
0φ > , 0κ < , and 0τ < , then the latter result is more likely whenever 1 0
dc
dr
→ , 
2 0
dc
dr
→ , 
0
pdp
dp
→−∞ , 
0
pdp
dp
→−∞ , 
0
Edp
dp
→−∞ , and pe →∞ .■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Provided 1 0
d
dp
ε
≠  holds, then the only way for the social planner to achieve zero 
deadweight loss is to set the pollution cap and revenue distribution in such a way that 
1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1
0
p
p
dpdc dc dc dc d dcdr dr
d dr d d d dp d dr d
ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε
    
+ + − + + =   
     
. This in turn means that 
achieving Pareto efficiency requires weighing the benefits of transferring income to 
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group 1 against its cost. Benefits and costs are determined by increases in consumption of 
group 1 due to income effects ( 1
1
dc
dε
), reductions in consumption of group 2 due to 
negative income effects ( 2
2
dc
dε
− ), and changes in consumption of groups 1 and 2 due to 
changes in prices ( 1
1
dc dr
dr dε
, 2
1
dc dr
dr dε
, and 2 2
2 1
p
p
dpdc d
d dp d
ε
ε ε
).52 If group 1 earns a very low 
level of income relative to group 2 then income elasticity of demand from group 1 will be 
high relative to that from group 2 rendering: 
1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1
1
p
p
dpdc dc dc d dcdr dr
d dr d d dp d dr d
ε
ε ε ε ε ε
   
+ > − +          
.  
 If 2
1
1
p
p
dpd
dp d
ε
ε
 
−  
 
>0 equalization of both sides of the inequality requires a reduction in 
income elasticity of demand from group 1 and an increase in that from group 2. Under 
concave Engel curves this is accomplished through an increase in transfers to group 1 
(low income households) and a reduction in transfers to group 2 (high income 
households). Therefore, all else constant, increases in transfers to low income households 
enhance Pareto efficiency (i.e. minimize deadweight losses). 
 If 2
1
1
p
p
dpd
dp d
ε
ε
 
−  
 
<0 while transfers to low income households will reduce income 
elasticity of demand from group 1 reducing the left hand side of the inequality they will 
also increase income elasticity of demand from group 2. The latter effect tends to reduce 
the right hand side of the inequality increasing deadweight losses. Therefore it is not clear 
                                                 
52 Note that changes in the price of permits only affect consumption of group 2. This is because we 
modeled transfers to group 2 from government’s budget equilibrium as ( )0 02 1 1, ,pp p p Iε ε ε= − .  
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in this case that increases in efficiency are positively correlated with transfers to low 
income households. 
 Finally since 2
p
d
dp
ε
>0 (i.e. increases in the value of permits increases the value of 
income transfers to group 2) then  2
1
1
p
p
dpd
dp d
ε
ε
 
−  
 
>0 (and a positive link between 
efficiency and transfers to low income households) is more likely the higher 
1
pdp
dε
 ■ 
 
Deadweight Losses from Orthogonality Assumption 
( ) * orth
p p
d DWL
V V
dp
= − = 
*
1 2
*
1 21 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
1 2
1 1 1 2 1
1 2
1 2
1
          
MSB
p
c c
p
MSC
p p
dpdc d dc d dc d dc d ddr dr dr dr
u u
dr dp d dp d dp dr dp d dp d dp d dp
u u
ε ε ε ε ε
η η
ε ε ε ε ε
η η
      
+ + + + + −                 
+ +
upcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmidupcurlybracketright
upcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmid
0
0
1 2
1 2 1 21 2
1 2 1 2
MSB
MSC
c c p p
dc dcdr dr
u u u u
dr dp dr dp
η η η η
 
     
− + + +    
    
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upcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmidupcurlybracketright
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Cancelation of corresponding terms yields: 
( )
1 2
1 21 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
1 2
1 1 1 2 1
1
p
c c
p
dpd DWL dc d dc d dc d dc d ddr dr
u u
dp dr d dp d dp dr d dp d dp d dp
ε ε ε ε ε
η η
ε ε ε ε ε
      
= + + + −                 
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